The Philosopher and Politics: The Roots of Arendt’s Critique of Philosophy
In this chapter, we return to Arendt’s distinction between philosophy and politics by focusing on the figure of an unworldly philosopher. We choose Heidegger as a paradigmatic example to highlight what Arendt meant when she spoke of a déformation professionelle of philosophers, unable to engage genu...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
---|---|
Format: | Buchkapitel |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
Zusammenfassung: | In this chapter, we return to Arendt’s distinction between philosophy and politics by focusing on the figure of an unworldly philosopher. We choose Heidegger as a paradigmatic example to highlight what Arendt meant when she spoke of a déformation professionelle of philosophers, unable to engage genuinely in politics due to their profession. Philosophers, Arendt argues, tend to refuse to assume political responsibility and are incapable of judging in political matters, or even abstain from judging. They are egocentric in their singularity and do not care about the common world they share with others. They incline toward narcissism. And when forced to take a political stand, they behave opportunistically.As is well known, Arendt was influenced by Heidegger and his philosophy during her student years and this influence manifests itself time and again in her work. Her short affair with the philosopher and the impact of his thought on Arendt’s writings often become the subject of discussion—especially in the context of Heidegger’s engagement with National Socialism. Could it be that Arendt excused him for his involvement as a rector of Freiburg University? Why did she, a Jew, repeatedly present him as a philosophical authority, especially in her later writings, despite these compromising events? Why would she not distance herself from Heidegger forever, as for example Hans Jonas or Herbert Marcuse did? To address these questions, we need to look at her theory, but also into her biography. Like Jaspers in his Psychology of Worldviews (1919), Arendt holds “that thought itself arises out of incidents of the living experience and must remain bound to them as the only guideposts by which to take its bearings” (GBPF 14).To illuminate the complicated and unstable attitude of Arendt toward Heidegger, we choose to not just contrast her well-known Heidegger essays, “What is Existential Philosophy?” (1946) and “Heidegger at Eighty” (1971 [German edition 1969]), which is the default way of shaping this discussion. Our account rests on a deeper reading, considering not only what she wrote for the public but also her private exchanges with her friends. |
---|---|
DOI: | 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474497220.003.0005 |