An Experimental Investigation of the Hahn-Noll Revenue Neutral Auction for Emissions Licenses
This paper reports on three series of laboratory experiments designed to test the performance of the Hahn-Noll revenue neutral auction (RNA). An alternative institution, a no-rebate uniform price auction (UPA), is also examined as a benchmark. In these experiments, the RNA markets were little differ...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of environmental economics and management 1993, Vol.24 (1), p.1-24 |
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| container_title | Journal of environmental economics and management |
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| creator | Franciosi, Robert Isaac, R.Mark Pingry, David E. Reynolds, Stanley S. |
| description | This paper reports on three series of laboratory experiments designed to test the performance of the Hahn-Noll revenue neutral auction (RNA). An alternative institution, a no-rebate uniform price auction (UPA), is also examined as a benchmark. In these experiments, the RNA markets were little different from UPA markets in terms of either prices or market efficiencies. The two institutions did differ in terms of the distribution of the gains from exchange and of the propensity of bidders to engage in a certain type of overbidding. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1006/jeem.1993.1001 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0095-0696 |
| ispartof | Journal of environmental economics and management, 1993, Vol.24 (1), p.1-24 |
| issn | 0095-0696 1096-0449 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_osti_scitechconnect_6929824 |
| source | RePEc; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals; Periodicals Index Online |
| subjects | ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES Auctions DATA ECONOMIC POLICY ECONOMICS Emissions trading ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY FINANCIAL INCENTIVES GOVERNMENT POLICIES INFORMATION 290201 -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Economics-- (1992-) LICENSES Market theory MARKETING RESEARCH PERMITS Pollution POLLUTION SOURCES Regulation Studies |
| title | An Experimental Investigation of the Hahn-Noll Revenue Neutral Auction for Emissions Licenses |
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