The concept of the use of recycled uranium for increasing the degree of security of export deliveries of fuel for light-water reactors

The present paper deals with investigation of the possibilities for reducing the risk of proliferation of fissionable materials by means of increasing the degree of protection of fresh fuel intended for light-water reactors against unsanctioned use in the case of withdrawal of a recipient country of deliveries from IAEA safeguards. It is shown that the use of recycled uranium for manufacturing export nuclear fuel makes transfer of nuclear material removed from the fuel assemblies for weapons purposes difficult because of the presence of isotope 232 U, whose content increases when one attempts to enrich uranium extracted from fresh fuel. In combination with restricted access to technologies for isotope separation by means of establishing international centers for uranium enrichment, this technical measure can significantly reduce the risk of proliferation associated with export deliveries of fuel made of low-enriched uranium. The assessment of a maximum level of contamination of nuclear material being transferred by isotope 232 U for the given isotope composition of the initial fuel is obtained. The concept of further investigations of the degree of security of export deliveries of fuel assemblies with recycled uranium intended for light-water reactors is suggested.