Space Shuttle Orbiter Reaction Jet Driver (RJD): Independent Technical Assessment/Inspection (ITA/I) Report, Version 1.0

Space Shuttle Orbiter Reaction Jet Driver (RJD): Independent Technical Assessment/Inspection (ITA/I) Report, Version 1.0

The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) has a zero-fault-tolerant design related to an inadvertent firing of the primary reaction control jets on the Orbiter during mated operations with the International Space Station (ISS). Failure modes identified by the program as a wire-to-wire "smart" short...

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Hauptverfasser: Gilbrech, Richard J., Kichak, Robert A., Davis, Mitchell, Williams, Glenn, Thomas, Walter, III, Slenski, George A., Hetzel, Mark
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Spacecraft Design, Testing And Performance
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creator Gilbrech, Richard J.
Kichak, Robert A.
Davis, Mitchell
Williams, Glenn
Thomas, Walter, III
Slenski, George A.
Hetzel, Mark
description The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) has a zero-fault-tolerant design related to an inadvertent firing of the primary reaction control jets on the Orbiter during mated operations with the International Space Station (ISS). Failure modes identified by the program as a wire-to-wire "smart" short or a Darlington transistor short resulting in a failed-on primary thruster during mated operations with ISS can drive forces that exceed the structural capabilities of the docked Shuttle/ISS structure. The assessment team delivered 17 observations, 6 findings and 15 recommendations to the Space Shuttle Program.
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title Space Shuttle Orbiter Reaction Jet Driver (RJD): Independent Technical Assessment/Inspection (ITA/I) Report, Version 1.0
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