Self-Deception in Neurological Syndromes

One of the traditional views of self-deception has been in terms of a dynamicallydriven defense mechanism which is employed in order to enhance self-esteem by denying contradictory evidence. Denial is evident during stressful events in everyday life, as well as in cases of mental and somatic impairm...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Journal of mind and behavior 1999-03, Vol.20 (2), p.117-132
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description One of the traditional views of self-deception has been in terms of a dynamicallydriven defense mechanism which is employed in order to enhance self-esteem by denying contradictory evidence. Denial is evident during stressful events in everyday life, as well as in cases of mental and somatic impairments. A detailed analysis of a specific neurological syndrome, prosopagnosia, where covert recognition of familiar faces may coexist with lack of overt recognition, demonstrates the inapplicability of the dynamic interpretation of self-deception in terms of denial to some neurological syndromes, and the usefulness of a new conceptualization of this process in terms of dissociation between modular and central processes. It is proposed that self-deception be considered a complex process which may be conceived of as a defense mechanism in everyday life, and as a product of functional dissociation in neurological syndromes.
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subjects Consciousness
Diseases
Face
Face perception
Memory
Neurology
Neuropsychology
Prosopagnosia
Self
Self deception
title Self-Deception in Neurological Syndromes
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