MILL AND THE LIBERAL REJECTION OF LEGAL MORALISM
This article examines John Stuart Mill's position as the principal historical opponent of legal moralism. I argue that inattention to the particular form of his opposition to legal moralism has muddied the interpretation of his liberty principle. Specifically, Mill does not endorse what I call...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | History of philosophy quarterly 2015-01, Vol.32 (1), p.79-99 |
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| container_title | History of philosophy quarterly |
| container_volume | 32 |
| creator | Turner, Piers Norris |
| description | This article examines John Stuart Mill's position as the principal historical opponent of legal moralism. I argue that inattention to the particular form of his opposition to legal moralism has muddied the interpretation of his liberty principle. Specifically, Mill does not endorse what I call the illegitimacy thesis, according to which appeals to harmless wrongdoings, whether or not they exist, are illegitimate in the justification of legal interference. |
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| identifier | ISSN: 0740-0675 |
| ispartof | History of philosophy quarterly, 2015-01, Vol.32 (1), p.79-99 |
| issn | 0740-0675 2152-1026 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_jstor_primary_43488116 |
| source | Jstor Complete Legacy |
| title | MILL AND THE LIBERAL REJECTION OF LEGAL MORALISM |
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