Universale Vernetztheit der Welt nicht nur als Grund lückenloser Determination, sondern auch als Ermöglichung von Kontingenz?

According to the Principle of Sufficient Reason every event is determined down to the smallest detail. This principle entails a global determinism which is connected with the claim of uniformity: All things are basically one and differ only by degrees. Accordingly, Leibniz tries to explain the traditional distinction of necessity and contingency by the difference between a definite demonstration and an open, never ending analysis, that is a quantitative difference between the finite and infinite. It is controversial whether contingency can be saved by this conception in the face of the thesis: Every predicate which can be truly attributed to a subject is included in the complete notion of this individual substance. The difficulties of the Lucky Proof can only be avoided by supposing: The infinity of analysis cannot be based on the fact that the complete notion is a simple conjunction of innumerable predicates which are not conceptually connected to each other. Then every predicate could be deduced from it in a finite number of steps; therefore, it would have been demonstrated and would consequently be necessary. The infinity of analysis cannot be either based on the fact that it is infinitely complex to prove that the subject is not contradictory. Conceptions like this or a superessentialism are not adequate, because they fail to distinguish between necessary and contingent statements about an individual within a single possible world. The complete notion and, therefore, the analysis of a contingent truth comprises an infinitely complex content, because the predicates of an individual are connected by infinitely complex relations. This corresponds to the idea that the perceptions of an individual mirror the infinitely complex connections by which the world is determined. Le principe de raison suffisante consiste en l’exigence que chaque événement soit déterminé dans les moindres détails. Ce principe implique un déterminisme global qui est lié à l’uniformité selon laquelle il n’y a que des degrés différents. Leibniz tâche ainsi d’éclairer la distinction traditionnelle entre nécessité et contingence en introduisant la différence entre une démonstration définitive et une analyse ouverte qui ne cesse jamais. Cette différence est pour lui une différence quantitative entre fini et infini. Il reste controversé qu’on puisse maintenir l’idée de la contingence ainsi face à la thèse selon laquelle chaque prédicat attribué véritablement au sujet est compris dans la no