ANTITRUST REMEDIES FOR LABOR MARKET POWER

Recent research indicates that labor market power has contributed to wage inequality and economic stagnation. Although the antitrust laws prohibit firms from restricting competition in labor markets as in product markets, the government does little to address the labor market problem, and private li...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Harvard law review 2018-12, Vol.132 (2), p.536-601
Hauptverfasser:	Naidu, Suresh, Posner, Eric A., Weyl, Glen
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Antitrust law Antitrust law (International law) Consolidation and merger of corporations CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EMPLOYMENT LAW Influence Labor market Laws, regulations and rules Market power Remedies Remedies (Law) TRADE PRACTICES
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creator	Naidu, Suresh Posner, Eric A. Weyl, Glen
description	Recent research indicates that labor market power has contributed to wage inequality and economic stagnation. Although the antitrust laws prohibit firms from restricting competition in labor markets as in product markets, the government does little to address the labor market problem, and private litigation has been rare and mostly unsuccessful. One reason is that the analytic methods for evaluating labor market power in antitrust contexts are far less sophisticated than the legal rules used to judge product market power. To remedy this asymmetry, we propose methods for judging the effects of mergers on labor markets. We also extend our approach to other forms of anticompetitive practices undertaken by employers against workers. We highlight some arguments and evidence indicating that market power may be even more important in labor markets than in product markets.
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subjects	Antitrust law Antitrust law (International law) Consolidation and merger of corporations CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EMPLOYMENT LAW Influence Labor market Laws, regulations and rules Market power Remedies Remedies (Law) TRADE PRACTICES
title	ANTITRUST REMEDIES FOR LABOR MARKET POWER
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