HEGEL'S "IDEA OF LIFE" AND INTERNAL PURPOSIVENESS
The first part of the final section of Hegel's Science of Logic, the section "The Idea," is titled "Life." Logic being the science of thought for Hegel, this section presents Hegel's account of the form of thought peculiar to thinking about living beings as living. Hege...
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description | The first part of the final section of Hegel's Science of Logic, the section "The Idea," is titled "Life." Logic being the science of thought for Hegel, this section presents Hegel's account of the form of thought peculiar to thinking about living beings as living. Hegel's full account of this form of thought holds that a living being is (1) a functionally organized totality of members (2) that maintains itself in and through its environment (3) in the manner of some particular species. I develop Hegel's account in critical conversation with Kant's more limited principle, in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, for judging about internally purposive "natural ends" as beings in which every part is both means and end to every other. I argue that Hegel's view rationally develops from attempting to think through Kant's principle, retaining what is valuable in Kant's insights without treating the life sciences with skepticism. |
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