How Not to Think about the Ethics of Deceiving into Sex

It is widely held that some kinds of deception into sex (e.g., lying about what pets one likes) do not undermine the moral force of consent while other kinds of deception do (e.g., impersonating the consenter's partner). Tom Dougherty argues against this: whenever someone is deceived into sex b...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Ethics 2017-01, Vol.127 (2), p.415-429
1. Verfasser:	Manson, Neil C.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Consent Credibility Deception DISCUSSION Ethics Sex Sexuality
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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