How Not to Think about the Ethics of Deceiving into Sex

It is widely held that some kinds of deception into sex (e.g., lying about what pets one likes) do not undermine the moral force of consent while other kinds of deception do (e.g., impersonating the consenter's partner). Tom Dougherty argues against this: whenever someone is deceived into sex b...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Ethics 2017-01, Vol.127 (2), p.415-429
1. Verfasser:	Manson, Neil C.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Consent Credibility Deception DISCUSSION Ethics Sex Sexuality
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description	It is widely held that some kinds of deception into sex (e.g., lying about what pets one likes) do not undermine the moral force of consent while other kinds of deception do (e.g., impersonating the consenter's partner). Tom Dougherty argues against this: whenever someone is deceived into sex by the concealment of a "deal breaker" fact, the normative situation is the same as there being no consent at all. Here it is argued that this conclusion is unwarranted. Dougherty's negative arguments against alternative theories of the deceptive undermining of consent are flawed, and his two positive arguments are unjustified.
doi_str_mv	10.1086/688743
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Tom Dougherty argues against this: whenever someone is deceived into sex by the concealment of a "deal breaker" fact, the normative situation is the same as there being no consent at all. Here it is argued that this conclusion is unwarranted. Dougherty's negative arguments against alternative theories of the deceptive undermining of consent are flawed, and his two positive arguments are unjustified.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0014-1704</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1539-297X</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1086/688743</identifier><identifier>CODEN: ETHIAY</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Chicago: University of Chicago Press</publisher><subject>Consent ; Credibility ; Deception ; DISCUSSION ; Ethics ; Sex ; Sexuality</subject><ispartof>Ethics, 2017-01, Vol.127 (2), p.415-429</ispartof><rights>2017 by The University of Chicago</rights><rights>2017 by The University of Chicago. 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identifier	ISSN: 0014-1704
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language	eng
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source	Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Jstor Complete Legacy; Political Science Complete
subjects	Consent Credibility Deception DISCUSSION Ethics Sex Sexuality
title	How Not to Think about the Ethics of Deceiving into Sex
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