Adverse Risk Incentives and the Design of Performance-Based Contracts

This paper uses option pricing theory to value and analyze many performance-based fee contracts that are currently in use. A potential problem with some of these contracts is that they may induce portfolio managers to adversely alter the risk of the portfolios they manage. The paper is prescriptive...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Management science 1989-07, Vol.35 (7), p.807-822
Hauptverfasser:	Grinblatt, Mark, Titman, Sheridan
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Applied sciences Asset management Call options Contract incentives Contract management Decision theory. Utility theory Exact sciences and technology Fees Financial management Financial portfolios fund management Operational research and scientific management Operational research. Management science options performance fees Portfolio management Present value Risk management
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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