Alternate Strategies for a Win-Win Seeking Agent in Agent-Human Negotiations
With the growth of e-commerce and e-markets, there is an increasing potential for the use of software agents to negotiate business tasks with human negotiators. Guided by design science methodology, this research prescribes and validates a win-win seeking negotiation agent using strategies of "...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of management information systems 2012-12, Vol.29 (3), p.223-256 |
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| container_end_page | 256 |
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| container_title | Journal of management information systems |
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| creator | Yang, Yinping Singhal, Sharad Xu, Yunjie |
| description | With the growth of e-commerce and e-markets, there is an increasing potential for the use of software agents to negotiate business tasks with human negotiators. Guided by design science methodology, this research prescribes and validates a win-win seeking negotiation agent using strategies of "simultaneous-equivalent offers" and "delayed acceptance" and compares their effects against the use of conventional sequential-single offer and immediate acceptance strategies. To evaluate the alternate strategies, a negotiation agent system was implemented and an experiment was conducted in which 110 agent-human dyads negotiated over a four-issue online purchase task. Our results indicate that the proposed agent strategies can enhance the economic performance of the negotiated outcome (counterpart agreement ratio, individual utility, joint utility, and the distance to Pareto-efficient frontier) and maintain the human counterparts' positive perceptions toward the outcome and the agent. The findings confirm the efficacy of the proposed design and showcase an innovative system to facilitate e-commerce transactions. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.2753/MIS0742-1222290307 |
| format | Article |
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Guided by design science methodology, this research prescribes and validates a win-win seeking negotiation agent using strategies of "simultaneous-equivalent offers" and "delayed acceptance" and compares their effects against the use of conventional sequential-single offer and immediate acceptance strategies. To evaluate the alternate strategies, a negotiation agent system was implemented and an experiment was conducted in which 110 agent-human dyads negotiated over a four-issue online purchase task. Our results indicate that the proposed agent strategies can enhance the economic performance of the negotiated outcome (counterpart agreement ratio, individual utility, joint utility, and the distance to Pareto-efficient frontier) and maintain the human counterparts' positive perceptions toward the outcome and the agent. 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The findings confirm the efficacy of the proposed design and showcase an innovative system to facilitate e-commerce transactions.</description><subject>agent-human negotiation</subject><subject>Bargaining</subject><subject>delayed acceptance</subject><subject>Design</subject><subject>Design evaluation</subject><subject>design science</subject><subject>Dyadics</subject><subject>Economic utility</subject><subject>Electronic commerce</subject><subject>electronic markets</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Information storage and retrieval systems</subject><subject>Innovation</subject><subject>negotiation agent</subject><subject>Principal-agent theory</subject><subject>Research design</subject><subject>Settlement counteroffers</subject><subject>simultaneous-equivalent offers</subject><subject>Social perception</subject><subject>Strategic planning</subject><subject>Utility theory</subject><subject>win-win negotiation</subject><issn>0742-1222</issn><issn>1557-928X</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2012</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp9UM9LwzAUDqLgnP4DgtCjl2qSJm1z8DCGusHUwxS9hTRNSmaXzCRD9t8b7dCbDx7f430_Dh8A5whe4YoW1w_zJawIzhFOw2ABqwMwQpRWOcP12yEY_bLH4CSEFYQQMcxGYDHpo_JWRJUto0_QGRUy7Xwmsldj87TZUql3Y7ts0ikbs_T4OfLZdi1s9qg6F42IxtlwCo606IM62-MYvNzdPk9n-eLpfj6dLHJZ1FXMmxIzKQktaStF3VCisaSYFLKmhDVa6xI2lWoIqrTEiDJGIC6bVrKWaVHTphiDyyF3493HVoXI1yZI1ffCKrcNHBFUo4LhqkxSPEildyF4pfnGm7XwO44g_66O76vjf9Ul08VgWoXo_K8DFymTpOQxuBl4Y1NTa_HpfN_yKHa989oLK03gxT_5X-R4fk4</recordid><startdate>20121201</startdate><enddate>20121201</enddate><creator>Yang, Yinping</creator><creator>Singhal, Sharad</creator><creator>Xu, Yunjie</creator><general>Routledge</general><general>M. 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Guided by design science methodology, this research prescribes and validates a win-win seeking negotiation agent using strategies of "simultaneous-equivalent offers" and "delayed acceptance" and compares their effects against the use of conventional sequential-single offer and immediate acceptance strategies. To evaluate the alternate strategies, a negotiation agent system was implemented and an experiment was conducted in which 110 agent-human dyads negotiated over a four-issue online purchase task. Our results indicate that the proposed agent strategies can enhance the economic performance of the negotiated outcome (counterpart agreement ratio, individual utility, joint utility, and the distance to Pareto-efficient frontier) and maintain the human counterparts' positive perceptions toward the outcome and the agent. 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| identifier | ISSN: 0742-1222 |
| ispartof | Journal of management information systems, 2012-12, Vol.29 (3), p.223-256 |
| issn | 0742-1222 1557-928X |
| language | eng |
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| source | Business Source Complete; JSTOR |
| subjects | agent-human negotiation Bargaining delayed acceptance Design Design evaluation design science Dyadics Economic utility Electronic commerce electronic markets Game theory Information storage and retrieval systems Innovation negotiation agent Principal-agent theory Research design Settlement counteroffers simultaneous-equivalent offers Social perception Strategic planning Utility theory win-win negotiation |
| title | Alternate Strategies for a Win-Win Seeking Agent in Agent-Human Negotiations |
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