The Politics of Judicial Retirement in Canada and the United Kingdom
In this study, we test theories of judicial retirement developed in the United States to study patterns of retirement in Canada and England. We explore whether there is evidence that justices time their departures to strategically advance partisan or policy goals. Using survival analysis to examine...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of law and courts 2014-09, Vol.2 (2), p.273-299 |
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| container_end_page | 299 |
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| container_issue | 2 |
| container_start_page | 273 |
| container_title | Journal of law and courts |
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| creator | Massie, Tajuana Randazzo, Kirk A. Songer, Donald R. |
| description | In this study, we test theories of judicial retirement developed in the United States to study patterns of retirement in Canada and England. We explore whether there is evidence that justices time their departures to strategically advance partisan or policy goals. Using survival analysis to examine the career patterns of judges appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada (1875–2012), as well as the House of Lords of the United Kingdom (1875–2009), we find that there is no evidence of strategy to achieve political objectives. Instead, these judges either choose to stay as long as possible or retire for personal reasons. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1086/677057 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 2164-6570 |
| ispartof | Journal of law and courts, 2014-09, Vol.2 (2), p.273-299 |
| issn | 2164-6570 2164-6589 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_jstor_primary_10_1086_677057 |
| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; HeinOnline Law Journal Library; Cambridge Journals; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing |
| subjects | Age Canada England Judges Legislative Bodies Mandatory retirement Partisanship Political parties Political partisanship Prime ministers Retirement Retirement age Retirement parties Statistical significance United Kingdom United States of America United States Supreme Court |
| title | The Politics of Judicial Retirement in Canada and the United Kingdom |
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