Valuing Diversity

This paper explores the economics of diversity-enhancing policies. A model is proposed in which heterogeneous agents, distinguished by skill level and social identity, purchase productive opportunities in a competitive market. We analyze policies designed to raise the status of a disadvantaged ident...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Journal of political economy 2013-08, Vol.121 (4), p.747-774
Hauptverfasser: Fryer, Roland G., Loury, Glenn C.
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creator Fryer, Roland G.
Loury, Glenn C.
description This paper explores the economics of diversity-enhancing policies. A model is proposed in which heterogeneous agents, distinguished by skill level and social identity, purchase productive opportunities in a competitive market. We analyze policies designed to raise the status of a disadvantaged identity group. When agent identity is contractible, efficient policy grants preferred access to slots but offers no direct assistance for acquiring skills. When identity is not contractible, efficient policy provides universal subsidies to skill development when the fraction of the disadvantaged group at the skill development margin is larger than their share at the slot assignment margin.
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subjects Affirmative action
Agency theory
Allocative efficiency
Competitiveness
Economic models
Economic policy
Economic theory
Government subsidies
Investment rates
Investment subsidies
Laissez faire
Market efficiency
Market prices
Political economy
Productivity
Skill development
Skills
Social identity
Studies
Tax policy
Tax subsidies
title Valuing Diversity
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