On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Empirical Science
This paper examines contemporary attempts to explicate the explanatory role of mathematics in the physical sciences. Most such approaches involve developing so-called mapping accounts of the relationships between the physical world and mathematical structures. The paper argues that the use of ideali...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The British journal for the philosophy of science 2010-03, Vol.61 (1), p.1-25 |
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description | This paper examines contemporary attempts to explicate the explanatory role of mathematics in the physical sciences. Most such approaches involve developing so-called mapping accounts of the relationships between the physical world and mathematical structures. The paper argues that the use of idealizations in physical theorizing poses serious difficulties for such mapping accounts. A new approach to the applicability of mathematics is proposed. Introduction Mathematical Explanations I: Entities Mathematical Explanations II: Operations Mapping Accounts: Strengths Mapping Accounts: Idealizations 5.1Pincock and matching models 5.2Bueno, Colyvan, and the inferential conception Mapping Accounts: Limitations Suggestions for a New Approach Conclusion |
doi_str_mv | 10.1093/bjps/axp018 |
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Most such approaches involve developing so-called mapping accounts of the relationships between the physical world and mathematical structures. The paper argues that the use of idealizations in physical theorizing poses serious difficulties for such mapping accounts. A new approach to the applicability of mathematics is proposed. Introduction Mathematical Explanations I: Entities Mathematical Explanations II: Operations Mapping Accounts: Strengths Mapping Accounts: Idealizations 5.1Pincock and matching models 5.2Bueno, Colyvan, and the inferential conception Mapping Accounts: Limitations Suggestions for a New Approach Conclusion</description><identifier>ISSN: 0007-0882</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1464-3537</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axp018</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Oxford: Oxford University Press</publisher><subject>Applied mathematics ; Empirical science ; Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge ; Fluids ; Idealization ; Mathematical models ; Mathematical objects ; Phenomena ; Philosophy ; Physical theory ; Thermodynamics</subject><ispartof>The British journal for the philosophy of science, 2010-03, Vol.61 (1), p.1-25</ispartof><rights>2010 British Society for the Philosophy of Science</rights><rights>Oxford University Press © The Author (2009). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science . All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org 2009</rights><rights>2009 by The Author. 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Most such approaches involve developing so-called mapping accounts of the relationships between the physical world and mathematical structures. The paper argues that the use of idealizations in physical theorizing poses serious difficulties for such mapping accounts. A new approach to the applicability of mathematics is proposed. Introduction Mathematical Explanations I: Entities Mathematical Explanations II: Operations Mapping Accounts: Strengths Mapping Accounts: Idealizations 5.1Pincock and matching models 5.2Bueno, Colyvan, and the inferential conception Mapping Accounts: Limitations Suggestions for a New Approach Conclusion</description><subject>Applied mathematics</subject><subject>Empirical science</subject><subject>Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge</subject><subject>Fluids</subject><subject>Idealization</subject><subject>Mathematical models</subject><subject>Mathematical objects</subject><subject>Phenomena</subject><subject>Philosophy</subject><subject>Physical theory</subject><subject>Thermodynamics</subject><issn>0007-0882</issn><issn>1464-3537</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2010</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNqFkM9LwzAUx4MoOKcnz0IP6kXq8rNp8aTb3MTpwB8gXkKapq61a0PSwfbfm1GZR0-P8P3kvfd5AJwieI1gQgZpadxArg1E8R7oIRrRkDDC90EPQshDGMf4EBw5V_pnFCW0B27mddAudDBem0rWsm3sJnhpKh00efAkfbKUbaFcUNTBeGkKWyhZBa-q0LXSx-Agl5XTJ7-1D97vx2_DaTibTx6Gt7NQUQzbUCcaZTiSimo_VMYpp5nCiMWRIhqnqUwJTRhHscxSTRGEjDCJkyzhDOZKUdIHV11fZRvnrM6FscVS2o1AUGy9xdZbdN6evuhoI51fNreyVoXbfcGYUkgZ9Nx5x63Uwlt9NcZq50TZrGztbf7aXXZYszL_zD3rwNL5K-5Q6p0pZtznYZcXrtXrXS7tt4g44UxMPz7F5DF5voN8JEbkB3mqjBE</recordid><startdate>20100301</startdate><enddate>20100301</enddate><creator>Batterman, Robert W.</creator><general>Oxford University Press</general><general>The University of Chicago Press</general><scope>BSCLL</scope><scope>IQODW</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20100301</creationdate><title>On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Empirical Science</title><author>Batterman, Robert W.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c420t-e9e1d26ac4e066a8b74dc21586c3e2bbab3495718adbe4100535a29d9750fcc43</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2010</creationdate><topic>Applied mathematics</topic><topic>Empirical science</topic><topic>Epistemology. 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subjects | Applied mathematics Empirical science Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge Fluids Idealization Mathematical models Mathematical objects Phenomena Philosophy Physical theory Thermodynamics |
title | On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Empirical Science |
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