SEIMI: Efficient and Secure SMAP-Enabled Intra-process Memory Isolation

Memory-corruption attacks such as code-reuse attacks and data-only attacks have been a key threat to systems security. To counter these threats, researchers have proposed a variety of defenses, including control-flow integrity (CFI), code-pointer integrity (CPI), and code (re-)randomization. All of...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Hauptverfasser:	Wang, Zhe, Wu, Chenggang, Xie, Mengyao, Zhang, Yinqian, Lu, Kangjie, Zhang, Xiaofeng, Lai, Yuanming, Kang, Yan, Yang, Min
Format:	Tagungsbericht
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Data structures Hardware Kernel Registers Runtime Security Switches
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