Detection of Counterfeit ICs Using Public Identification Sequences and Side-Channel Leakage
In this paper, we present a new approach for counterfeit protection against remarked, overproduced, and out-of-spec integrated circuits (ICs). Our approach uses identification sequences that are regularly published by the original chip manufacturer and hidden in the electromagnetic (EM) leakage of a...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | IEEE transactions on information forensics and security 2019-03, Vol.14 (3), p.803-813 |
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| container_title | IEEE transactions on information forensics and security |
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| creator | Samarin, Peter Lemke-Rust, Kerstin |
| description | In this paper, we present a new approach for counterfeit protection against remarked, overproduced, and out-of-spec integrated circuits (ICs). Our approach uses identification sequences that are regularly published by the original chip manufacturer and hidden in the electromagnetic (EM) leakage of authentic chips. A portion of the chip area is dedicated to a crypto engine running in stream cipher mode that is initialized with a unique key and an initialization vector stored in one-time-programmable antifuse memory. IC identification is carried out in the field by obtaining EM measurements of deployed ICs and by proving the presence of the genuine identification sequences in the measurements. We evaluate our approach using a proof-of-concept implementation on three FPGA boards by capturing EM leakage of the FPGAs under test at their decoupling capacitors. The results show that the user can carry out IC identification on-site, using standard lab equipment in short amount of time. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1109/TIFS.2018.2866333 |
| format | Article |
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Our approach uses identification sequences that are regularly published by the original chip manufacturer and hidden in the electromagnetic (EM) leakage of authentic chips. A portion of the chip area is dedicated to a crypto engine running in stream cipher mode that is initialized with a unique key and an initialization vector stored in one-time-programmable antifuse memory. IC identification is carried out in the field by obtaining EM measurements of deployed ICs and by proving the presence of the genuine identification sequences in the measurements. We evaluate our approach using a proof-of-concept implementation on three FPGA boards by capturing EM leakage of the FPGAs under test at their decoupling capacitors. The results show that the user can carry out IC identification on-site, using standard lab equipment in short amount of time.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1556-6013</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1556-6021</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1109/TIFS.2018.2866333</identifier><identifier>CODEN: ITIFA6</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>New York: IEEE</publisher><subject>Algorithms ; antifuse memory ; Antifuses ; chip ID ; Ciphers ; Circuit protection ; Counterfeit ; Counterfeit protection ; Counterfeiting ; Decoupling ; EM leakage ; Encryption ; Foundries ; IC identification ; Identification ; Integrated circuits ; Leakage ; leakage circuits ; Pins ; Running in ; side channels ; stream cipher ; Temperature measurement</subject><ispartof>IEEE transactions on information forensics and security, 2019-03, Vol.14 (3), p.803-813</ispartof><rights>Copyright The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) 2019</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c245t-ada25e2467451ace953f0e1302b43a891c0ff899f5e292e1d222d720bc8283073</cites><orcidid>0000-0002-4287-5038</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8443392$$EHTML$$P50$$Gieee$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,796,27922,27923,54756</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8443392$$EView_record_in_IEEE$$FView_record_in_$$GIEEE</linktorsrc></links><search><creatorcontrib>Samarin, Peter</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Lemke-Rust, Kerstin</creatorcontrib><title>Detection of Counterfeit ICs Using Public Identification Sequences and Side-Channel Leakage</title><title>IEEE transactions on information forensics and security</title><addtitle>TIFS</addtitle><description>In this paper, we present a new approach for counterfeit protection against remarked, overproduced, and out-of-spec integrated circuits (ICs). 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The results show that the user can carry out IC identification on-site, using standard lab equipment in short amount of time.</description><subject>Algorithms</subject><subject>antifuse memory</subject><subject>Antifuses</subject><subject>chip ID</subject><subject>Ciphers</subject><subject>Circuit protection</subject><subject>Counterfeit</subject><subject>Counterfeit protection</subject><subject>Counterfeiting</subject><subject>Decoupling</subject><subject>EM leakage</subject><subject>Encryption</subject><subject>Foundries</subject><subject>IC identification</subject><subject>Identification</subject><subject>Integrated circuits</subject><subject>Leakage</subject><subject>leakage circuits</subject><subject>Pins</subject><subject>Running in</subject><subject>side channels</subject><subject>stream cipher</subject><subject>Temperature measurement</subject><issn>1556-6013</issn><issn>1556-6021</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2019</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>RIE</sourceid><recordid>eNo9kD1PwzAQhi0EEqXwAxCLJeYUn-0kzogChUiVQGo7MViucy4uxSlxMvDvSWnV6W543vt4CLkFNgFgxcOims4nnIGacJVlQogzMoI0zZKMcTg_9SAuyVWMG8akhEyNyMcTdmg73wTaOFo2feiwdeg7WpWRLqMPa_rer7be0qrG0HnnrfnH5_jTY7AYqQk1nfsak_LThIBbOkPzZdZ4TS6c2Ua8OdYxWU6fF-VrMnt7qcrHWWK5TLvE1IanyGWWyxSMxSIVjiEIxldSGFWAZc6ponADVHCEmnNe55ytrOJKsFyMyf1h7q5thptipzdN34ZhpeYAOWS5GB4fEzhQtm1ibNHpXeu_Tfurgem9Q713qPcO9dHhkLk7ZDwinnglpRAFF3-jBWw7</recordid><startdate>20190301</startdate><enddate>20190301</enddate><creator>Samarin, Peter</creator><creator>Lemke-Rust, Kerstin</creator><general>IEEE</general><general>The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)</general><scope>97E</scope><scope>RIA</scope><scope>RIE</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7SC</scope><scope>7SP</scope><scope>7TB</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>FR3</scope><scope>JQ2</scope><scope>KR7</scope><scope>L7M</scope><scope>L~C</scope><scope>L~D</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4287-5038</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20190301</creationdate><title>Detection of Counterfeit ICs Using Public Identification Sequences and Side-Channel Leakage</title><author>Samarin, Peter ; Lemke-Rust, Kerstin</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c245t-ada25e2467451ace953f0e1302b43a891c0ff899f5e292e1d222d720bc8283073</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2019</creationdate><topic>Algorithms</topic><topic>antifuse memory</topic><topic>Antifuses</topic><topic>chip ID</topic><topic>Ciphers</topic><topic>Circuit protection</topic><topic>Counterfeit</topic><topic>Counterfeit protection</topic><topic>Counterfeiting</topic><topic>Decoupling</topic><topic>EM leakage</topic><topic>Encryption</topic><topic>Foundries</topic><topic>IC identification</topic><topic>Identification</topic><topic>Integrated circuits</topic><topic>Leakage</topic><topic>leakage circuits</topic><topic>Pins</topic><topic>Running in</topic><topic>side channels</topic><topic>stream cipher</topic><topic>Temperature measurement</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Samarin, Peter</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Lemke-Rust, Kerstin</creatorcontrib><collection>IEEE All-Society Periodicals Package (ASPP) 2005-present</collection><collection>IEEE All-Society Periodicals Package (ASPP) 1998-Present</collection><collection>IEEE Electronic Library (IEL)</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Computer and Information Systems Abstracts</collection><collection>Electronics & Communications Abstracts</collection><collection>Mechanical & Transportation Engineering Abstracts</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>Engineering Research Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Computer Science Collection</collection><collection>Civil Engineering Abstracts</collection><collection>Advanced Technologies Database with Aerospace</collection><collection>Computer and Information Systems Abstracts Academic</collection><collection>Computer and Information Systems Abstracts Professional</collection><jtitle>IEEE transactions on information forensics and security</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Samarin, Peter</au><au>Lemke-Rust, Kerstin</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Detection of Counterfeit ICs Using Public Identification Sequences and Side-Channel Leakage</atitle><jtitle>IEEE transactions on information forensics and security</jtitle><stitle>TIFS</stitle><date>2019-03-01</date><risdate>2019</risdate><volume>14</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>803</spage><epage>813</epage><pages>803-813</pages><issn>1556-6013</issn><eissn>1556-6021</eissn><coden>ITIFA6</coden><abstract>In this paper, we present a new approach for counterfeit protection against remarked, overproduced, and out-of-spec integrated circuits (ICs). Our approach uses identification sequences that are regularly published by the original chip manufacturer and hidden in the electromagnetic (EM) leakage of authentic chips. A portion of the chip area is dedicated to a crypto engine running in stream cipher mode that is initialized with a unique key and an initialization vector stored in one-time-programmable antifuse memory. IC identification is carried out in the field by obtaining EM measurements of deployed ICs and by proving the presence of the genuine identification sequences in the measurements. We evaluate our approach using a proof-of-concept implementation on three FPGA boards by capturing EM leakage of the FPGAs under test at their decoupling capacitors. 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| language | eng |
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| source | IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) |
| subjects | Algorithms antifuse memory Antifuses chip ID Ciphers Circuit protection Counterfeit Counterfeit protection Counterfeiting Decoupling EM leakage Encryption Foundries IC identification Identification Integrated circuits Leakage leakage circuits Pins Running in side channels stream cipher Temperature measurement |
| title | Detection of Counterfeit ICs Using Public Identification Sequences and Side-Channel Leakage |
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