A Web Traffic Analysis Attack Using Only Timing Information

We introduce an attack against encrypted Web traffic that makes use only of packet timing information on the uplink. This attack is therefore impervious to existing packet padding defenses. In addition, unlike existing approaches, this timing-only attack does not require the knowledge of the start/e...

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Veröffentlicht in:	IEEE transactions on information forensics and security 2016-08, Vol.11 (8), p.1747-1759
Hauptverfasser:	Feghhi, Saman, Leith, Douglas J.
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Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Cryptography Downlink Servers Timing Uplink Web pages
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container_title	IEEE transactions on information forensics and security
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creator	Feghhi, Saman Leith, Douglas J.
description	We introduce an attack against encrypted Web traffic that makes use only of packet timing information on the uplink. This attack is therefore impervious to existing packet padding defenses. In addition, unlike existing approaches, this timing-only attack does not require the knowledge of the start/end of web fetches and so is effective against traffic streams. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the attack against both wired and wireless traffic, achieving mean success rates in excess of 90%. In addition to being of interest in its own right, this timing-only attack serves to highlight deficiencies in existing defenses and so to areas where it would be beneficial for virtual private network (VPN) designers to focus further attention.
doi_str_mv	10.1109/TIFS.2016.2551203
format	Article
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subjects	Cryptography Downlink Servers Timing Uplink Web pages
title	A Web Traffic Analysis Attack Using Only Timing Information
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