IEMI Threats for Information Security: Remote Command Injection on Modern Smartphones
Numerous papers dealing with the analysis of electromagnetic attacks against critical electronic devices have been made publicly available. In this paper, we exploit the principle of front-door coupling on smartphones headphone cables with specific electromagnetic waveforms. We present a smart use o...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | IEEE transactions on electromagnetic compatibility 2015-12, Vol.57 (6), p.1752-1755 |
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| container_title | IEEE transactions on electromagnetic compatibility |
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| creator | Kasmi, Chaouki Lopes Esteves, Jose |
| description | Numerous papers dealing with the analysis of electromagnetic attacks against critical electronic devices have been made publicly available. In this paper, we exploit the principle of front-door coupling on smartphones headphone cables with specific electromagnetic waveforms. We present a smart use of intentional electromagnetic interference, resulting in finer impacts on an information system than a classical denial of service effect. As an outcome, we introduce a new silent remote voice command injection technique on modern smartphones. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1109/TEMC.2015.2463089 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | IEEE transactions on electromagnetic compatibility, 2015-12, Vol.57 (6), p.1752-1755 |
| issn | 0018-9375 1558-187X |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_ieee_primary_7194754 |
| source | IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) |
| subjects | Commands Computer information security Computers Dealing Electromagnetic compatibility Electronic warfare Frequency modulation Hardware Headphones information security Information systems intentional electromagnetic interference Microphones Security Smart phones Smartphones Waveforms |
| title | IEMI Threats for Information Security: Remote Command Injection on Modern Smartphones |
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