Leveraging on-chip voltage regulators as a countermeasure against side-channel attacks

Side-channel attacks have become a significant threat to the integrated circuit security. Circuit level techniques are proposed in this paper as a countermeasure against side-channel attacks. A distributed on-chip power delivery system consisting of multi-level switched capacitor (SC) voltage conver...

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Hauptverfasser: Yu, Weize, Uzun, Orhun Aras, Köse, Selçuk
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description Side-channel attacks have become a significant threat to the integrated circuit security. Circuit level techniques are proposed in this paper as a countermeasure against side-channel attacks. A distributed on-chip power delivery system consisting of multi-level switched capacitor (SC) voltage converters is proposed where the individual interleaved stages are turned on and turned off either based on the workload information or pseudo-randomly to scramble the power consumption profile. In the case that the changes in the workload demand do not trigger the power delivery system to turn on or off individual stages, the active stages are reshuffled with so called converter-reshuffling to insert random spikes in the power consumption profile. An entropy based metric is developed to evaluate the security-performance of the proposed converter-reshuffling technique as compared to three other existing on-chip power delivery schemes. The increase in the power trace entropy with CoRe scheme is also demonstrated with simulation results to further verify the theoretical analysis.
doi_str_mv 10.1145/2744769.2744866
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ispartof 2015 52nd ACM/EDAC/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC), 2015, p.1-6
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subjects Applied computing -- Physical sciences and engineering -- Electronics
Entropy
Hardware -- Emerging technologies
Hardware -- Very large scale integration design
Monitoring
on-chip voltage regulation
Power demand
power efficiency
Regulators
Security
Security and privacy
Side-channel attacks
Social and professional topics -- Computing -- technology policy -- Computer crime
System-on-chip
Voltage control
title Leveraging on-chip voltage regulators as a countermeasure against side-channel attacks
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