Redefining web browser principals with a Configurable Origin Policy

With the advent of Web 2.0, web developers have designed multiple additions to break SOP boundary, such as splitting and combining traditional web browser protection boundaries (security principals). However, these newly generated principals lack a new label to represent its security property. To ad...

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Hauptverfasser: Yinzhi Cao, Rastogi, Vaibhav, Zhichun Li, Yan Chen, Moshchuk, Alexander
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Rastogi, Vaibhav
Zhichun Li
Yan Chen
Moshchuk, Alexander
description With the advent of Web 2.0, web developers have designed multiple additions to break SOP boundary, such as splitting and combining traditional web browser protection boundaries (security principals). However, these newly generated principals lack a new label to represent its security property. To address the inconsistent label problem, this paper proposes a new way to define a security principal and its labels in the browser. In particular, we propose a Configurable Origin Policy (COP), in which a browser's security principal is defined by a configurable ID rather than a fixed triple . The server-side and client-side code of a web application can create, join, and destroy its own principals. We perform a formal security analysis on COP to ensure session integrity. Then we also show that COP is compatible with legacy web sites, and those sites utilizing COP are also compatible with legacy browsers.
doi_str_mv 10.1109/DSN.2013.6575317
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subjects Browsers
Google
Mashups
Ports (Computers)
Security
Servers
Web sites
title Redefining web browser principals with a Configurable Origin Policy
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