Strategy of Recycling Waste Resource with Governmental Incentives and Funds
The collection of used products and subsequent remanufacturing has been increasingly encouraged by government incentives and funds. Assuming new products stochastic demands and end-of-products stochastic returns, a reverse supply chain recycling system led by government is established. Recycling fun...
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| creator | Zhaoyun Tian |
| description | The collection of used products and subsequent remanufacturing has been increasingly encouraged by government incentives and funds. Assuming new products stochastic demands and end-of-products stochastic returns, a reverse supply chain recycling system led by government is established. Recycling fund from manufacturers, government subsidies and a target rebate-punish contract between government and recyclers are designed. Based on games theory and optimization theory, the optimal decisions are obtained in both decentralized and centralized conditions respectively. Finally, the performance of the proposed solution method has been demonstrated by a numerical simulation. By the economic consequences of these decisions, managerial insights and economic implications relevant to policy makers are obtained. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1109/ICM.2011.260 |
| format | Conference Proceeding |
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Assuming new products stochastic demands and end-of-products stochastic returns, a reverse supply chain recycling system led by government is established. Recycling fund from manufacturers, government subsidies and a target rebate-punish contract between government and recyclers are designed. Based on games theory and optimization theory, the optimal decisions are obtained in both decentralized and centralized conditions respectively. Finally, the performance of the proposed solution method has been demonstrated by a numerical simulation. By the economic consequences of these decisions, managerial insights and economic implications relevant to policy makers are obtained.</description><subject>Biological system modeling</subject><subject>Contracts</subject><subject>Distribution functions</subject><subject>Government</subject><subject>Recycling</subject><subject>recycling fund and subsidy</subject><subject>reverse supply chain</subject><subject>Stackelberg games</subject><subject>Stochastic processes</subject><subject>Supply chains</subject><subject>waste resource</subject><isbn>9781457714191</isbn><isbn>1457714191</isbn><isbn>9780769545226</isbn><isbn>076954522X</isbn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>conference_proceeding</rsrctype><creationdate>2011</creationdate><recordtype>conference_proceeding</recordtype><sourceid>6IE</sourceid><sourceid>RIE</sourceid><recordid>eNotjM1Kw0AURkdEUGp27tzMCyTOncxPZinB1mBF0ILLcpPc1Eg6lcy0krc3qN_mnLP5GLsBkQEId1eVz5kUAJk04owlzhbCGqeVltKc_zYobS0ocHDJkhA-xTxjnHTFFXt6iyNG2k380PFXaqZm6P2Ov2OINHc4HMeG-HcfP_jqcKLR78lHHHjlm1n6EwWOvuXLo2_DNbvocAiU_HPBNsuHTfmYrl9WVXm_TnsnYmprq1EZVaDG2qJUpKhoRANOdnUBpHN0rbYSnC5y7FTdojSKsHbKQA5dvmC3f7c9EW2_xn6P47Q1ALkVKv8B4d9N0Q</recordid><startdate>201109</startdate><enddate>201109</enddate><creator>Zhaoyun Tian</creator><general>IEEE</general><scope>6IE</scope><scope>6IL</scope><scope>CBEJK</scope><scope>RIE</scope><scope>RIL</scope></search><sort><creationdate>201109</creationdate><title>Strategy of Recycling Waste Resource with Governmental Incentives and Funds</title><author>Zhaoyun Tian</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-i90t-7b75a4648a5ab7a24e4e8c0c192fb81e53a9d57219583af4bda264eab946131f3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>conference_proceedings</rsrctype><prefilter>conference_proceedings</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2011</creationdate><topic>Biological system modeling</topic><topic>Contracts</topic><topic>Distribution functions</topic><topic>Government</topic><topic>Recycling</topic><topic>recycling fund and subsidy</topic><topic>reverse supply chain</topic><topic>Stackelberg games</topic><topic>Stochastic processes</topic><topic>Supply chains</topic><topic>waste resource</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Zhaoyun Tian</creatorcontrib><collection>IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings</collection><collection>IEEE Proceedings Order Plan All Online (POP All Online) 1998-present by volume</collection><collection>IEEE Xplore All Conference Proceedings</collection><collection>IEEE/IET Electronic Library (IEL)</collection><collection>IEEE Proceedings Order Plans (POP All) 1998-Present</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Zhaoyun Tian</au><format>book</format><genre>proceeding</genre><ristype>CONF</ristype><atitle>Strategy of Recycling Waste Resource with Governmental Incentives and Funds</atitle><btitle>2011 International Conference of Information Technology, Computer Engineering and Management Sciences</btitle><stitle>ICM</stitle><date>2011-09</date><risdate>2011</risdate><volume>4</volume><spage>113</spage><epage>116</epage><pages>113-116</pages><isbn>9781457714191</isbn><isbn>1457714191</isbn><eisbn>9780769545226</eisbn><eisbn>076954522X</eisbn><abstract>The collection of used products and subsequent remanufacturing has been increasingly encouraged by government incentives and funds. Assuming new products stochastic demands and end-of-products stochastic returns, a reverse supply chain recycling system led by government is established. Recycling fund from manufacturers, government subsidies and a target rebate-punish contract between government and recyclers are designed. Based on games theory and optimization theory, the optimal decisions are obtained in both decentralized and centralized conditions respectively. Finally, the performance of the proposed solution method has been demonstrated by a numerical simulation. By the economic consequences of these decisions, managerial insights and economic implications relevant to policy makers are obtained.</abstract><pub>IEEE</pub><doi>10.1109/ICM.2011.260</doi><tpages>4</tpages></addata></record> |
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| ispartof | 2011 International Conference of Information Technology, Computer Engineering and Management Sciences, 2011, Vol.4, p.113-116 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings |
| subjects | Biological system modeling Contracts Distribution functions Government Recycling recycling fund and subsidy reverse supply chain Stackelberg games Stochastic processes Supply chains waste resource |
| title | Strategy of Recycling Waste Resource with Governmental Incentives and Funds |
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