Securing random key predistribution against semi-honest adversaries
Recently, Eschenauer and Gligor proposed a model for random key predistribution in distributed sensor networks. In this paper we study the security of this model against a semi-honest adversary who compromises nodes, and present a key establishment algorithm that is provably secure. This is the firs...
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| creator | Burmester, M. Safavi-Naini, R. Taban, G. |
| description | Recently, Eschenauer and Gligor proposed a model for random key predistribution in distributed sensor networks. In this paper we study the security of this model against a semi-honest adversary who compromises nodes, and present a key establishment algorithm that is provably secure. This is the first and only protocol that can guarantee security against semi-honest adversaries in an analytical framework. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1109/INSS.2009.5409937 |
| format | Conference Proceeding |
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In this paper we study the security of this model against a semi-honest adversary who compromises nodes, and present a key establishment algorithm that is provably secure. 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In this paper we study the security of this model against a semi-honest adversary who compromises nodes, and present a key establishment algorithm that is provably secure. This is the first and only protocol that can guarantee security against semi-honest adversaries in an analytical framework.</description><subject>Access protocols</subject><subject>Base stations</subject><subject>Costs</subject><subject>Information security</subject><subject>Intrusion detection</subject><subject>Joining processes</subject><subject>Privacy</subject><subject>Protection</subject><subject>Public key cryptography</subject><subject>Wireless sensor networks</subject><isbn>1424463130</isbn><isbn>9781424463138</isbn><isbn>1424463149</isbn><isbn>9781424463145</isbn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>conference_proceeding</rsrctype><creationdate>2009</creationdate><recordtype>conference_proceeding</recordtype><sourceid>6IE</sourceid><sourceid>RIE</sourceid><recordid>eNpFj0FLw0AUhFdEUGt_gHjJH0h8m33Z3XeUoLZQ9JDey27zWldNUnZTof_egAXnMvMxMDBC3EsopAR6XL41TVECUFEhEClzIW4llohaSaTLf1BwLeYpfcIkRZU25kbUDW-PMfT7LLq-Hbrsi0_ZIXIb0hiDP45h6DO3d6FPY5a4C_nH0POUXfvDMbkYON2Jq537Tjw_-0ysX57X9SJfvb8u66dVHgjGHKFlTaTRlFvbWiBNUjJXXitnUJPX0iogz8jeu12F0rrSW2n81KBlNRMPf7OBmTeHGDoXT5vzZ_ULXDhLLg</recordid><startdate>200906</startdate><enddate>200906</enddate><creator>Burmester, M.</creator><creator>Safavi-Naini, R.</creator><creator>Taban, G.</creator><general>IEEE</general><scope>6IE</scope><scope>6IL</scope><scope>CBEJK</scope><scope>RIE</scope><scope>RIL</scope></search><sort><creationdate>200906</creationdate><title>Securing random key predistribution against semi-honest adversaries</title><author>Burmester, M. ; Safavi-Naini, R. ; Taban, G.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-i90t-40de6996472c8d8096911ee5b63a7469b618309be4ebbaf5418a2b817bb6148e3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>conference_proceedings</rsrctype><prefilter>conference_proceedings</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2009</creationdate><topic>Access protocols</topic><topic>Base stations</topic><topic>Costs</topic><topic>Information security</topic><topic>Intrusion detection</topic><topic>Joining processes</topic><topic>Privacy</topic><topic>Protection</topic><topic>Public key cryptography</topic><topic>Wireless sensor networks</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Burmester, M.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Safavi-Naini, R.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Taban, G.</creatorcontrib><collection>IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings</collection><collection>IEEE Proceedings Order Plan All Online (POP All Online) 1998-present by volume</collection><collection>IEEE Xplore All Conference Proceedings</collection><collection>IEEE Electronic Library (IEL)</collection><collection>IEEE Proceedings Order Plans (POP All) 1998-Present</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Burmester, M.</au><au>Safavi-Naini, R.</au><au>Taban, G.</au><format>book</format><genre>proceeding</genre><ristype>CONF</ristype><atitle>Securing random key predistribution against semi-honest adversaries</atitle><btitle>2009 Sixth International Conference on Networked Sensing Systems (INSS)</btitle><stitle>INSS</stitle><date>2009-06</date><risdate>2009</risdate><spage>1</spage><epage>4</epage><pages>1-4</pages><isbn>1424463130</isbn><isbn>9781424463138</isbn><eisbn>1424463149</eisbn><eisbn>9781424463145</eisbn><abstract>Recently, Eschenauer and Gligor proposed a model for random key predistribution in distributed sensor networks. In this paper we study the security of this model against a semi-honest adversary who compromises nodes, and present a key establishment algorithm that is provably secure. This is the first and only protocol that can guarantee security against semi-honest adversaries in an analytical framework.</abstract><pub>IEEE</pub><doi>10.1109/INSS.2009.5409937</doi><tpages>4</tpages></addata></record> |
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| ispartof | 2009 Sixth International Conference on Networked Sensing Systems (INSS), 2009, p.1-4 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings |
| subjects | Access protocols Base stations Costs Information security Intrusion detection Joining processes Privacy Protection Public key cryptography Wireless sensor networks |
| title | Securing random key predistribution against semi-honest adversaries |
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