pwdArmor: Protecting Conventional Password-Based Authentications

pwdArmor is a framework for fortifying conventional password-based authentications. Many password protocols are performed within an encrypted tunnel (e.g., TLS) to prevent the exposure of the password itself, or of material for an offline password guessing attack. Failure to establish, or to correct...

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Hauptverfasser: Seamons, Kent E., van der Horst, Timothy W.
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description pwdArmor is a framework for fortifying conventional password-based authentications. Many password protocols are performed within an encrypted tunnel (e.g., TLS) to prevent the exposure of the password itself, or of material for an offline password guessing attack. Failure to establish, or to correctly verify, this tunnel completely invalidates its protections. The rampant success of phishing demonstrates the risk of relying solely on the user to ensure that a tunnel is established with the correct entity. pwdArmor wraps around existing password protocols. It thwarts passive attacks and improves detection, by both users and servers, of man-in-the middle attacks. If a user is tricked into authenticating to an attacker, instead of the real server, the user's password is never disclosed. Although pwdArmor does not require an encrypted tunnel, it gains added protection from active attack if one is employed; even if the tunnel is established with an attacker and not the real server. These assurances significantly reduce the effectiveness of password phishing. Wrapping a protocol with pwdArmor requires no modification to the underlying protocol or to its existing database of password verifiers.
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identifier ISSN: 1063-9527
ispartof 2008 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC), 2008, p.443-452
issn 1063-9527
2576-9103
language eng
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source IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings
subjects Application software
Authentication
Computer security
Cryptography
Internet
Protection
Protocols
Public key
Web server
Wrapping
title pwdArmor: Protecting Conventional Password-Based Authentications
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