The research on coordination of cigarette supply chain with substitute cigarette products

In China, tobacco is a state-run monopoly and facing more fierece competition after entry to WTO. In the paper, a model of cigarette supply chain which is composed of the Tobacco Monopoly Administration and one cigarette retailer is considered. The Tobacco Monopoly Administration acts as the leader....

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Guohua Sun, Yaohua Wu, Jiwei Xiao, Li Liao, Hongchun Hu, Jie Wei
Format: Tagungsbericht
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext bestellen
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page 2184
container_issue
container_start_page 2180
container_title
container_volume
creator Guohua Sun
Yaohua Wu
Jiwei Xiao
Li Liao
Hongchun Hu
Jie Wei
description In China, tobacco is a state-run monopoly and facing more fierece competition after entry to WTO. In the paper, a model of cigarette supply chain which is composed of the Tobacco Monopoly Administration and one cigarette retailer is considered. The Tobacco Monopoly Administration acts as the leader. There are two kinds of substitute cigarette products sold in the market. The two kinds of cigarette products have different price elasticity of demand. The optimal order quantity of each cigarette product of the cigarette supply chain with wholesale price-only contract in the decentralized case by the retailer is half that of the cigarette supply chain in the centralized case. Also, the optimal unit retail price of each cigarette product in the decentralized case is higher than that in the centralized case. The total profit of the cigarette supply chain with wholesale price only contract in the decentralized case is less than half of the optimal profit in the centralized case. To achieve the optimal profit of the centralized cigarette supply chain in the decentralized case, a two-part tariff contract is proposed to coordinate the cigarette supply chain. The results are helpful to enhance the competibility of the cigarette supply chain in China.
doi_str_mv 10.1109/ICAL.2008.4636525
format Conference Proceeding
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>ieee_6IE</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_ieee_primary_4636525</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><ieee_id>4636525</ieee_id><sourcerecordid>4636525</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-i175t-4a7190e609939765cf5b78bfdfb8f6c8be49b5cccad2a9f67ba64eb590d1ed103</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpFkFtLAzEQheOlYFv7A8SX_IGtuWfzKMUbFHypoE8lyU7cSO0uSYr037vFqvMynPMNB84gdEXJnFJibp4Wt8s5I6SeC8WVZPIETahgQjBJuDhFY0YVrWqqXs_QzOj6lzFy_sckHaHJIcMQro24QLOcP8gwQnJp-Bi9rVrACTLY5FvcbbHvutTErS1xEF3APr7bBKUAzru-3-yxb23c4q9Y2sFxucSyG-D_WZ-6ZudLvkSjYDcZZsc9RS_3d6vFY7V8fjhUqyLVslTCamoIKGIMN1pJH6TTtQtNcHVQvnYgjJPee9swa4LSzioBThrSUGgo4VN0_ZMbAWDdp_hp0359fBn_BtOqW14</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Publisher</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>conference_proceeding</recordtype></control><display><type>conference_proceeding</type><title>The research on coordination of cigarette supply chain with substitute cigarette products</title><source>IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings</source><creator>Guohua Sun ; Yaohua Wu ; Jiwei Xiao ; Li Liao ; Hongchun Hu ; Jie Wei</creator><creatorcontrib>Guohua Sun ; Yaohua Wu ; Jiwei Xiao ; Li Liao ; Hongchun Hu ; Jie Wei</creatorcontrib><description>In China, tobacco is a state-run monopoly and facing more fierece competition after entry to WTO. In the paper, a model of cigarette supply chain which is composed of the Tobacco Monopoly Administration and one cigarette retailer is considered. The Tobacco Monopoly Administration acts as the leader. There are two kinds of substitute cigarette products sold in the market. The two kinds of cigarette products have different price elasticity of demand. The optimal order quantity of each cigarette product of the cigarette supply chain with wholesale price-only contract in the decentralized case by the retailer is half that of the cigarette supply chain in the centralized case. Also, the optimal unit retail price of each cigarette product in the decentralized case is higher than that in the centralized case. The total profit of the cigarette supply chain with wholesale price only contract in the decentralized case is less than half of the optimal profit in the centralized case. To achieve the optimal profit of the centralized cigarette supply chain in the decentralized case, a two-part tariff contract is proposed to coordinate the cigarette supply chain. The results are helpful to enhance the competibility of the cigarette supply chain in China.</description><identifier>ISSN: 2161-8151</identifier><identifier>ISBN: 9781424425020</identifier><identifier>ISBN: 1424425026</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 2161-816X</identifier><identifier>EISBN: 1424425034</identifier><identifier>EISBN: 9781424425037</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1109/ICAL.2008.4636525</identifier><identifier>LCCN: 2008903794</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>IEEE</publisher><subject>Cigarette Supply Chain ; Computer aided software engineering ; Contracts ; Industries ; Monopoly ; Optimization ; Production ; Supply chains ; Two-part Tariff Contract ; Wholesale Price-only Contract</subject><ispartof>2008 IEEE International Conference on Automation and Logistics, 2008, p.2180-2184</ispartof><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4636525$$EHTML$$P50$$Gieee$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>309,310,777,781,786,787,2052,27906,54901</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4636525$$EView_record_in_IEEE$$FView_record_in_$$GIEEE</linktorsrc></links><search><creatorcontrib>Guohua Sun</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Yaohua Wu</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Jiwei Xiao</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Li Liao</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Hongchun Hu</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Jie Wei</creatorcontrib><title>The research on coordination of cigarette supply chain with substitute cigarette products</title><title>2008 IEEE International Conference on Automation and Logistics</title><addtitle>ICAL</addtitle><description>In China, tobacco is a state-run monopoly and facing more fierece competition after entry to WTO. In the paper, a model of cigarette supply chain which is composed of the Tobacco Monopoly Administration and one cigarette retailer is considered. The Tobacco Monopoly Administration acts as the leader. There are two kinds of substitute cigarette products sold in the market. The two kinds of cigarette products have different price elasticity of demand. The optimal order quantity of each cigarette product of the cigarette supply chain with wholesale price-only contract in the decentralized case by the retailer is half that of the cigarette supply chain in the centralized case. Also, the optimal unit retail price of each cigarette product in the decentralized case is higher than that in the centralized case. The total profit of the cigarette supply chain with wholesale price only contract in the decentralized case is less than half of the optimal profit in the centralized case. To achieve the optimal profit of the centralized cigarette supply chain in the decentralized case, a two-part tariff contract is proposed to coordinate the cigarette supply chain. The results are helpful to enhance the competibility of the cigarette supply chain in China.</description><subject>Cigarette Supply Chain</subject><subject>Computer aided software engineering</subject><subject>Contracts</subject><subject>Industries</subject><subject>Monopoly</subject><subject>Optimization</subject><subject>Production</subject><subject>Supply chains</subject><subject>Two-part Tariff Contract</subject><subject>Wholesale Price-only Contract</subject><issn>2161-8151</issn><issn>2161-816X</issn><isbn>9781424425020</isbn><isbn>1424425026</isbn><isbn>1424425034</isbn><isbn>9781424425037</isbn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>conference_proceeding</rsrctype><creationdate>2008</creationdate><recordtype>conference_proceeding</recordtype><sourceid>6IE</sourceid><sourceid>RIE</sourceid><recordid>eNpFkFtLAzEQheOlYFv7A8SX_IGtuWfzKMUbFHypoE8lyU7cSO0uSYr037vFqvMynPMNB84gdEXJnFJibp4Wt8s5I6SeC8WVZPIETahgQjBJuDhFY0YVrWqqXs_QzOj6lzFy_sckHaHJIcMQro24QLOcP8gwQnJp-Bi9rVrACTLY5FvcbbHvutTErS1xEF3APr7bBKUAzru-3-yxb23c4q9Y2sFxucSyG-D_WZ-6ZudLvkSjYDcZZsc9RS_3d6vFY7V8fjhUqyLVslTCamoIKGIMN1pJH6TTtQtNcHVQvnYgjJPee9swa4LSzioBThrSUGgo4VN0_ZMbAWDdp_hp0359fBn_BtOqW14</recordid><startdate>200809</startdate><enddate>200809</enddate><creator>Guohua Sun</creator><creator>Yaohua Wu</creator><creator>Jiwei Xiao</creator><creator>Li Liao</creator><creator>Hongchun Hu</creator><creator>Jie Wei</creator><general>IEEE</general><scope>6IE</scope><scope>6IL</scope><scope>CBEJK</scope><scope>RIE</scope><scope>RIL</scope></search><sort><creationdate>200809</creationdate><title>The research on coordination of cigarette supply chain with substitute cigarette products</title><author>Guohua Sun ; Yaohua Wu ; Jiwei Xiao ; Li Liao ; Hongchun Hu ; Jie Wei</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-i175t-4a7190e609939765cf5b78bfdfb8f6c8be49b5cccad2a9f67ba64eb590d1ed103</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>conference_proceedings</rsrctype><prefilter>conference_proceedings</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2008</creationdate><topic>Cigarette Supply Chain</topic><topic>Computer aided software engineering</topic><topic>Contracts</topic><topic>Industries</topic><topic>Monopoly</topic><topic>Optimization</topic><topic>Production</topic><topic>Supply chains</topic><topic>Two-part Tariff Contract</topic><topic>Wholesale Price-only Contract</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Guohua Sun</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Yaohua Wu</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Jiwei Xiao</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Li Liao</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Hongchun Hu</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Jie Wei</creatorcontrib><collection>IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings</collection><collection>IEEE Proceedings Order Plan All Online (POP All Online) 1998-present by volume</collection><collection>IEEE Xplore All Conference Proceedings</collection><collection>IEEE Electronic Library (IEL)</collection><collection>IEEE Proceedings Order Plans (POP All) 1998-Present</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Guohua Sun</au><au>Yaohua Wu</au><au>Jiwei Xiao</au><au>Li Liao</au><au>Hongchun Hu</au><au>Jie Wei</au><format>book</format><genre>proceeding</genre><ristype>CONF</ristype><atitle>The research on coordination of cigarette supply chain with substitute cigarette products</atitle><btitle>2008 IEEE International Conference on Automation and Logistics</btitle><stitle>ICAL</stitle><date>2008-09</date><risdate>2008</risdate><spage>2180</spage><epage>2184</epage><pages>2180-2184</pages><issn>2161-8151</issn><eissn>2161-816X</eissn><isbn>9781424425020</isbn><isbn>1424425026</isbn><eisbn>1424425034</eisbn><eisbn>9781424425037</eisbn><abstract>In China, tobacco is a state-run monopoly and facing more fierece competition after entry to WTO. In the paper, a model of cigarette supply chain which is composed of the Tobacco Monopoly Administration and one cigarette retailer is considered. The Tobacco Monopoly Administration acts as the leader. There are two kinds of substitute cigarette products sold in the market. The two kinds of cigarette products have different price elasticity of demand. The optimal order quantity of each cigarette product of the cigarette supply chain with wholesale price-only contract in the decentralized case by the retailer is half that of the cigarette supply chain in the centralized case. Also, the optimal unit retail price of each cigarette product in the decentralized case is higher than that in the centralized case. The total profit of the cigarette supply chain with wholesale price only contract in the decentralized case is less than half of the optimal profit in the centralized case. To achieve the optimal profit of the centralized cigarette supply chain in the decentralized case, a two-part tariff contract is proposed to coordinate the cigarette supply chain. The results are helpful to enhance the competibility of the cigarette supply chain in China.</abstract><pub>IEEE</pub><doi>10.1109/ICAL.2008.4636525</doi><tpages>5</tpages></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext_linktorsrc
identifier ISSN: 2161-8151
ispartof 2008 IEEE International Conference on Automation and Logistics, 2008, p.2180-2184
issn 2161-8151
2161-816X
language eng
recordid cdi_ieee_primary_4636525
source IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings
subjects Cigarette Supply Chain
Computer aided software engineering
Contracts
Industries
Monopoly
Optimization
Production
Supply chains
Two-part Tariff Contract
Wholesale Price-only Contract
title The research on coordination of cigarette supply chain with substitute cigarette products
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-19T20%3A05%3A17IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-ieee_6IE&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:book&rft.genre=proceeding&rft.atitle=The%20research%20on%20coordination%20of%20cigarette%20supply%20chain%20with%20substitute%20cigarette%20products&rft.btitle=2008%20IEEE%20International%20Conference%20on%20Automation%20and%20Logistics&rft.au=Guohua%20Sun&rft.date=2008-09&rft.spage=2180&rft.epage=2184&rft.pages=2180-2184&rft.issn=2161-8151&rft.eissn=2161-816X&rft.isbn=9781424425020&rft.isbn_list=1424425026&rft_id=info:doi/10.1109/ICAL.2008.4636525&rft_dat=%3Cieee_6IE%3E4636525%3C/ieee_6IE%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft.eisbn=1424425034&rft.eisbn_list=9781424425037&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_ieee_id=4636525&rfr_iscdi=true