Game Analysis in Water Resources Optimal Allocation
To implement the regional water resources optimal deployment, reasonable and efficient utilization of water resources for implementing the sustainable development of regional economy and society, a two-stage dynamic game model for water resources optimal allocation is set with the objective of maxim...
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| creator | Wang Yu-Peng Xie Jian-Cang Chen Lintao Kong Ker Thian Yew-Gan |
| description | To implement the regional water resources optimal deployment, reasonable and efficient utilization of water resources for implementing the sustainable development of regional economy and society, a two-stage dynamic game model for water resources optimal allocation is set with the objective of maximization the overall value of water resources. Water rights, public interests, water market and the water price in market which are determined by the dealers' decisions are all taken into account. The solution which satisfies both the administrator's resources allocation mandate and the consumers' private objectives is solved in the case of sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. An example is given to illustrate the idea with the purpose to provide useful decision support for the modern management of water resources in China |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1109/ICHIT.2006.253524 |
| format | Conference Proceeding |
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| identifier | ISBN: 9780769526744 |
| ispartof | 2006 International Conference on Hybrid Information Technology, 2006, Vol.1, p.443-446 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings |
| subjects | Electronic mail Game theory Government Guidelines Law Legal factors Nash equilibrium Resource management Sustainable development Water resources |
| title | Game Analysis in Water Resources Optimal Allocation |
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