Between detection and neutralization
Security system analytical performance analysis is generally based on the probability of system effectiveness. The probability of effectiveness is a function of the probabilities of interruption and neutralization. Interruption occurs if the response forces are notified in sufficient time to engage...
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| creator | Adams, D.G. Snell, M.K. Green, M.W. Pritchard, D.A. |
| description | Security system analytical performance analysis is generally based on the probability of system effectiveness. The probability of effectiveness is a function of the probabilities of interruption and neutralization. Interruption occurs if the response forces are notified in sufficient time to engage the adversary. Neutralization occurs if the adversary attack is defeated after the security forces have actively engaged the adversary. Both depend upon communications of data. This paper explores details of embedded communications functions that are often assumed to be inconsequential. It is the intent of the authors to bring focus to an issue in security system modeling that, if not well understood, has the potential to be a deciding factor in the overall system failure or effectiveness |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1109/CCST.2005.1594846 |
| format | Conference Proceeding |
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The probability of effectiveness is a function of the probabilities of interruption and neutralization. Interruption occurs if the response forces are notified in sufficient time to engage the adversary. Neutralization occurs if the adversary attack is defeated after the security forces have actively engaged the adversary. Both depend upon communications of data. This paper explores details of embedded communications functions that are often assumed to be inconsequential. It is the intent of the authors to bring focus to an issue in security system modeling that, if not well understood, has the potential to be a deciding factor in the overall system failure or effectiveness</abstract><pub>IEEE</pub><doi>10.1109/CCST.2005.1594846</doi></addata></record> |
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| identifier | ISSN: 1071-6572 |
| ispartof | Proceedings 39th Annual 2005 International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology, 2005, p.226-229 |
| issn | 1071-6572 2153-0742 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_ieee_primary_1594846 |
| source | IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings |
| subjects | Communication system security Data security Detectors Laboratories Modeling National security Performance analysis Probability Sensor systems Weapons |
| title | Between detection and neutralization |
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