S-ARP: a secure address resolution protocol
Tapping into the communication between two hosts on a LAN has become quite simple thanks to tools that can be downloaded from the Internet. Such tools use the address resolution protocol (ARP) poisoning technique, which relies on hosts caching reply messages even though the corresponding requests we...
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| creator | Bruschi, D. Ornaghi, A. Rosti, E. |
| description | Tapping into the communication between two hosts on a LAN has become quite simple thanks to tools that can be downloaded from the Internet. Such tools use the address resolution protocol (ARP) poisoning technique, which relies on hosts caching reply messages even though the corresponding requests were never sent. Since no message authentication is provided, any host of the LAN can forge a message containing malicious information. We present a secure version of ARP that provides protection against ARP poisoning. Each host has a public/private key pair certified by a local trusted party on the LAN, which acts as a certification authority. Messages are digitally signed by the sender, thus preventing the injection of spurious and/or spoofed information. As a proof of concept, the proposed solution was implemented on a Linux box. Performance measurements show that PKI based strong authentication is feasible to secure even low level protocols, as long as the overhead for key validity verification is kept small. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1109/CSAC.2003.1254311 |
| format | Conference Proceeding |
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Such tools use the address resolution protocol (ARP) poisoning technique, which relies on hosts caching reply messages even though the corresponding requests were never sent. Since no message authentication is provided, any host of the LAN can forge a message containing malicious information. We present a secure version of ARP that provides protection against ARP poisoning. Each host has a public/private key pair certified by a local trusted party on the LAN, which acts as a certification authority. Messages are digitally signed by the sender, thus preventing the injection of spurious and/or spoofed information. As a proof of concept, the proposed solution was implemented on a Linux box. 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| identifier | ISBN: 9780769520414 |
| ispartof | 19th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 2003. Proceedings, 2003, p.66-74 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings |
| subjects | Access protocols Certification Communication system security Cryptography Electronic mail Ethernet networks Internet Local area networks Message authentication Protection |
| title | S-ARP: a secure address resolution protocol |
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