Constant-Size Verifiable Timed Signatures from RSA Group for Bitcoin-Based Voting Protocols

A verifiable timed signature (VTS) scheme allows a signature to be time-locked to a known message for a predetermined duration denoted as \mathsf {T} T . Verifiability ensures that anyone can verify that the time-lock contains a valid signature without completing the computation. In this paper, we i...

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Veröffentlicht in:IEEE transactions on services computing 2024-07, Vol.17 (4), p.1414-1425
Hauptverfasser: Bao, Zijian, He, Debiao, Feng, Qi, Luo, Min, Zeng, Xiangyong
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creator Bao, Zijian
He, Debiao
Feng, Qi
Luo, Min
Zeng, Xiangyong
description A verifiable timed signature (VTS) scheme allows a signature to be time-locked to a known message for a predetermined duration denoted as \mathsf {T} T . Verifiability ensures that anyone can verify that the time-lock contains a valid signature without completing the computation. In this paper, we introduce a novel VTS construction method based on the RSA group, designed to maintain a constant level of size. This approach serves as an improvement over the previous linear level size construction method (CCS 2020). First, we construct it by using a commitment to a valid RSA signature. This commitment can only be opened to a regular RSA signature after a sequential computation period. Our scheme utilizes a trapdoor verifiable delay function, RSA signatures, and a specialized zero-knowledge proof to instantiate the proposed scheme. We also conduct proofs in three aspects: correctness, soundness, and security. Furthermore, we identify potential applications for VTS and present a simple Bitcoin voting protocol based on an open vote protocol by utilizing VTS. Experimental results show that our scheme is more efficient compared to the construction of VTS (CCS 2020), reducing the signature size by at least 90.5% and lowering computational costs by at least 77%.
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Verifiability ensures that anyone can verify that the time-lock contains a valid signature without completing the computation. In this paper, we introduce a novel VTS construction method based on the RSA group, designed to maintain a constant level of size. This approach serves as an improvement over the previous linear level size construction method (CCS 2020). First, we construct it by using a commitment to a valid RSA signature. This commitment can only be opened to a regular RSA signature after a sequential computation period. Our scheme utilizes a trapdoor verifiable delay function, RSA signatures, and a specialized zero-knowledge proof to instantiate the proposed scheme. We also conduct proofs in three aspects: correctness, soundness, and security. Furthermore, we identify potential applications for VTS and present a simple Bitcoin voting protocol based on an open vote protocol by utilizing VTS. Experimental results show that our scheme is more efficient compared to the construction of VTS (CCS 2020), reducing the signature size by at least 90.5% and lowering computational costs by at least 77%.]]></abstract><pub>IEEE</pub><doi>10.1109/TSC.2023.3347526</doi><tpages>12</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1819-9332</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6927-7855</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2145-9713</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8351-8766</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2446-7436</orcidid></addata></record>
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source IEEE Electronic Library (IEL)
subjects Authentication
bitcoin voting
Cryptography
Delays
Encryption
Privacy
Protocols
RSA signature
Security
Timed signature
zero-knowledge proof
title Constant-Size Verifiable Timed Signatures from RSA Group for Bitcoin-Based Voting Protocols
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