MAFIA: Protecting the Microarchitecture of Embedded Systems Against Fault Injection Attacks
Fault injection attacks represent an effective threat to embedded systems. Recently, Laurent et al. have reported that fault injection attacks can leverage faults inside the microarchitecture. However, state-of-the-art counter-measures, hardwareonly or with hardware support, do not consider the inte...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | IEEE transactions on computer-aided design of integrated circuits and systems 2023-12, Vol.42 (12), p.1-1 |
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| container_title | IEEE transactions on computer-aided design of integrated circuits and systems |
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| creator | Chamelot, Thomas Courousse, Damien Heydemann, Karine |
| description | Fault injection attacks represent an effective threat to embedded systems. Recently, Laurent et al. have reported that fault injection attacks can leverage faults inside the microarchitecture. However, state-of-the-art counter-measures, hardwareonly or with hardware support, do not consider the integrity of microarchitecture control signals that are the target of these faults. We present MAFIA, a microarchitecture protection against fault injection attacks. MAFIA ensures integrity of pipeline control signals through a signature-based mechanism, and ensures fine-grained control-flow integrity with a complete indirect branch support and code authenticity. We analyse the security properties of two different implementations with different security/ overhead trade-offs: one with a CBC-MAC/Prince signature function, and another one with a CRC32. We present our implementation of MAFIA in a RISC-V processor, supported by a dedicated compiler toolchain based on LLVM/Clang. We report a hardware area overhead of 23.8% and 6.5% for the CBC-MAC/Prince and CRC32 respectively. The average code size and execution time overheads are 29.4% and 18.4% respectively for the CRC32 implementation and are 50% and 39% for the CBC-MAC/Prince. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1109/TCAD.2023.3276507 |
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Recently, Laurent et al. have reported that fault injection attacks can leverage faults inside the microarchitecture. However, state-of-the-art counter-measures, hardwareonly or with hardware support, do not consider the integrity of microarchitecture control signals that are the target of these faults. We present MAFIA, a microarchitecture protection against fault injection attacks. MAFIA ensures integrity of pipeline control signals through a signature-based mechanism, and ensures fine-grained control-flow integrity with a complete indirect branch support and code authenticity. We analyse the security properties of two different implementations with different security/ overhead trade-offs: one with a CBC-MAC/Prince signature function, and another one with a CRC32. We present our implementation of MAFIA in a RISC-V processor, supported by a dedicated compiler toolchain based on LLVM/Clang. We report a hardware area overhead of 23.8% and 6.5% for the CBC-MAC/Prince and CRC32 respectively. The average code size and execution time overheads are 29.4% and 18.4% respectively for the CRC32 implementation and are 50% and 39% for the CBC-MAC/Prince.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0278-0070</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1937-4151</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1109/TCAD.2023.3276507</identifier><identifier>CODEN: ITCSDI</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>New York: IEEE</publisher><subject>Circuit faults ; code authenticity ; code integrity ; Codes ; Computer Science ; control logic ; control-flow integrity ; control-signal integrity ; counter-measures ; Cryptography and Security ; Embedded systems ; fault injection attacks ; Hardware ; Hardware Architecture ; Integrity ; Microarchitecture ; Microprocessors ; Pipelines ; Process control ; RISC ; Security ; System effectiveness</subject><ispartof>IEEE transactions on computer-aided design of integrated circuits and systems, 2023-12, Vol.42 (12), p.1-1</ispartof><rights>Copyright The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) 2023</rights><rights>Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c280t-bb0b7b86358987a73c5b25529a9c0263cb1b3f0ac5c244071697b5b8e2536bc13</cites><orcidid>0000-0003-2761-3627 ; 0000-0003-2092-924X ; 0000-0001-7037-6407</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10124740$$EHTML$$P50$$Gieee$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>230,315,781,785,797,886,27929,27930,54763</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10124740$$EView_record_in_IEEE$$FView_record_in_$$GIEEE</linktorsrc><backlink>$$Uhttps://cea.hal.science/cea-04099414$$DView record in HAL$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Chamelot, Thomas</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Courousse, Damien</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Heydemann, Karine</creatorcontrib><title>MAFIA: Protecting the Microarchitecture of Embedded Systems Against Fault Injection Attacks</title><title>IEEE transactions on computer-aided design of integrated circuits and systems</title><addtitle>TCAD</addtitle><description>Fault injection attacks represent an effective threat to embedded systems. Recently, Laurent et al. have reported that fault injection attacks can leverage faults inside the microarchitecture. However, state-of-the-art counter-measures, hardwareonly or with hardware support, do not consider the integrity of microarchitecture control signals that are the target of these faults. We present MAFIA, a microarchitecture protection against fault injection attacks. MAFIA ensures integrity of pipeline control signals through a signature-based mechanism, and ensures fine-grained control-flow integrity with a complete indirect branch support and code authenticity. We analyse the security properties of two different implementations with different security/ overhead trade-offs: one with a CBC-MAC/Prince signature function, and another one with a CRC32. We present our implementation of MAFIA in a RISC-V processor, supported by a dedicated compiler toolchain based on LLVM/Clang. We report a hardware area overhead of 23.8% and 6.5% for the CBC-MAC/Prince and CRC32 respectively. The average code size and execution time overheads are 29.4% and 18.4% respectively for the CRC32 implementation and are 50% and 39% for the CBC-MAC/Prince.</description><subject>Circuit faults</subject><subject>code authenticity</subject><subject>code integrity</subject><subject>Codes</subject><subject>Computer Science</subject><subject>control logic</subject><subject>control-flow integrity</subject><subject>control-signal integrity</subject><subject>counter-measures</subject><subject>Cryptography and Security</subject><subject>Embedded systems</subject><subject>fault injection attacks</subject><subject>Hardware</subject><subject>Hardware Architecture</subject><subject>Integrity</subject><subject>Microarchitecture</subject><subject>Microprocessors</subject><subject>Pipelines</subject><subject>Process control</subject><subject>RISC</subject><subject>Security</subject><subject>System effectiveness</subject><issn>0278-0070</issn><issn>1937-4151</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2023</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>RIE</sourceid><recordid>eNpNkEtLAzEUhYMoWB8_QHARcOVi6s1rkrgbaquFioK6chGSNLVT2xlNUsF_7wwVcXXh8p3D4UPojMCQENBXz6PqZkiBsiGjshQg99CAaCYLTgTZRwOgUhUAEg7RUUorAMIF1QP0el9NptU1foxtDj7XzRvOy4Dvax9bG_2y7r_bGHC7wOONC_N5mOOn75TDJuHqzdZNynhit-uMp82qb2gbXOVs_Xs6QQcLu07h9Pceo5fJ-Hl0V8webqejalZ4qiAXzoGTTpVMKK2klcwLR0W3zmoPtGTeEccWYL3wlHOQpNTSCacCFax0nrBjdLnrXdq1-Yj1xsZv09ra3FUz44M1wEFrTvhXz17s2I_Yfm5DymbVbmPTzTNUacok50p1FNlRnYWUYlj81RIwvW_T-za9b_Pru8uc7zJ1COEfTyiXHNgPxnx5xw</recordid><startdate>20231201</startdate><enddate>20231201</enddate><creator>Chamelot, Thomas</creator><creator>Courousse, Damien</creator><creator>Heydemann, Karine</creator><general>IEEE</general><general>The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. 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| subjects | Circuit faults code authenticity code integrity Codes Computer Science control logic control-flow integrity control-signal integrity counter-measures Cryptography and Security Embedded systems fault injection attacks Hardware Hardware Architecture Integrity Microarchitecture Microprocessors Pipelines Process control RISC Security System effectiveness |
| title | MAFIA: Protecting the Microarchitecture of Embedded Systems Against Fault Injection Attacks |
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