Partitioning attacks: or how to rapidly clone some GSM cards
In this paper, we introduce a new class of side-channel attacks called partitioning attacks. We have successfully launched a version of the attack on several implementations of COMP128, the popular GSM authentication algorithm that has been deployed by different service providers in several types of...
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| creator | Rao, J.R. Rohatgi, P. Scherzer, H. Tinguely, S. |
| description | In this paper, we introduce a new class of side-channel attacks called partitioning attacks. We have successfully launched a version of the attack on several implementations of COMP128, the popular GSM authentication algorithm that has been deployed by different service providers in several types of SIM cards, to retrieve the 128 bit key using as few as 8 chosen plaintexts. We show how partitioning attacks can be used effectively to attack implementations that have been equipped with ad hoc and inadequate countermeasures against side-channel attacks. Such ad hoc countermeasures are systemic in implementations of cryptographic algorithms, such as COMP128, which require the use of large tables since there has been a mistaken belief that sound countermeasures require more resources than are available. To address this problem, we describe a new resource-efficient countermeasure for protecting table lookups in cryptographic implementations and justify its correctness rigorously. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1109/SECPRI.2002.1004360 |
| format | Conference Proceeding |
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To address this problem, we describe a new resource-efficient countermeasure for protecting table lookups in cryptographic implementations and justify its correctness rigorously.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1081-6011</identifier><identifier>ISSN: 1063-7109</identifier><identifier>ISBN: 9780769515434</identifier><identifier>ISBN: 0769515436</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 2375-1207</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1109/SECPRI.2002.1004360</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Los Alamitos CA: IEEE</publisher><subject>Applied sciences ; Authentication ; Cloning ; Cryptographic protocols ; Cryptography ; Exact sciences and technology ; GSM ; Information, signal and communications theory ; Partitioning algorithms ; Protection ; Resists ; Security ; Signal and communications theory ; Table lookup ; Telecommunications ; Telecommunications and information theory ; Teleprocessing networks. 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We have successfully launched a version of the attack on several implementations of COMP128, the popular GSM authentication algorithm that has been deployed by different service providers in several types of SIM cards, to retrieve the 128 bit key using as few as 8 chosen plaintexts. We show how partitioning attacks can be used effectively to attack implementations that have been equipped with ad hoc and inadequate countermeasures against side-channel attacks. Such ad hoc countermeasures are systemic in implementations of cryptographic algorithms, such as COMP128, which require the use of large tables since there has been a mistaken belief that sound countermeasures require more resources than are available. To address this problem, we describe a new resource-efficient countermeasure for protecting table lookups in cryptographic implementations and justify its correctness rigorously.</description><subject>Applied sciences</subject><subject>Authentication</subject><subject>Cloning</subject><subject>Cryptographic protocols</subject><subject>Cryptography</subject><subject>Exact sciences and technology</subject><subject>GSM</subject><subject>Information, signal and communications theory</subject><subject>Partitioning algorithms</subject><subject>Protection</subject><subject>Resists</subject><subject>Security</subject><subject>Signal and communications theory</subject><subject>Table lookup</subject><subject>Telecommunications</subject><subject>Telecommunications and information theory</subject><subject>Teleprocessing networks. Isdn</subject><issn>1081-6011</issn><issn>1063-7109</issn><issn>2375-1207</issn><isbn>9780769515434</isbn><isbn>0769515436</isbn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>conference_proceeding</rsrctype><creationdate>2002</creationdate><recordtype>conference_proceeding</recordtype><sourceid>6IE</sourceid><sourceid>RIE</sourceid><recordid>eNpFkE1LAzEYhIMfYKn9Bb3koretb742G_EipdZCxWL1vCSbrEa3m5psKf33LrTgXOYwDwMzCI0JTAgBdbeeTVdviwkFoBMCwFkOZ2hAmRQZoSDP0UjJAmSuBBGc8Qs0IFCQLAdCrtAopW_oxQUHkg_Qw0rHznc-tL79xLrrdPWT7nGI-CvscRdw1FtvmwOumtA6nMLG4fn6BVc62nSNLmvdJDc6-RB9PM3ep8_Z8nW-mD4uM8-Ad5muDJXOFKLgStS2ttI4Y4VT3HCgRPZLnDBQGF0IyxwnwnFqpa25lLoAw4bo9ti7jeF351JXbnyqXNPo1oVdKqnMhVBc9eDNCdSp0k0ddVv5VG6j3-h4KImQQglGe2585Lxz7j8-nsn-AMSjZOo</recordid><startdate>2002</startdate><enddate>2002</enddate><creator>Rao, J.R.</creator><creator>Rohatgi, P.</creator><creator>Scherzer, H.</creator><creator>Tinguely, S.</creator><general>IEEE</general><scope>6IE</scope><scope>6IH</scope><scope>CBEJK</scope><scope>RIE</scope><scope>RIO</scope><scope>IQODW</scope><scope>7SC</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>JQ2</scope><scope>L7M</scope><scope>L~C</scope><scope>L~D</scope></search><sort><creationdate>2002</creationdate><title>Partitioning attacks: or how to rapidly clone some GSM cards</title><author>Rao, J.R. ; Rohatgi, P. ; Scherzer, H. ; Tinguely, S.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-i304t-acb27eb858495fdfd7bebd5e94b40217200e5b08ba85d3e415e42d7df477a80b3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>conference_proceedings</rsrctype><prefilter>conference_proceedings</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2002</creationdate><topic>Applied sciences</topic><topic>Authentication</topic><topic>Cloning</topic><topic>Cryptographic protocols</topic><topic>Cryptography</topic><topic>Exact sciences and technology</topic><topic>GSM</topic><topic>Information, signal and communications theory</topic><topic>Partitioning algorithms</topic><topic>Protection</topic><topic>Resists</topic><topic>Security</topic><topic>Signal and communications theory</topic><topic>Table lookup</topic><topic>Telecommunications</topic><topic>Telecommunications and information theory</topic><topic>Teleprocessing networks. Isdn</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Rao, J.R.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Rohatgi, P.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Scherzer, H.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Tinguely, S.</creatorcontrib><collection>IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings</collection><collection>IEEE Proceedings Order Plan (POP) 1998-present by volume</collection><collection>IEEE Xplore All Conference Proceedings</collection><collection>IEEE Electronic Library (IEL)</collection><collection>IEEE Proceedings Order Plans (POP) 1998-present</collection><collection>Pascal-Francis</collection><collection>Computer and Information Systems Abstracts</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Computer Science Collection</collection><collection>Advanced Technologies Database with Aerospace</collection><collection>Computer and Information Systems Abstracts Academic</collection><collection>Computer and Information Systems Abstracts Professional</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Rao, J.R.</au><au>Rohatgi, P.</au><au>Scherzer, H.</au><au>Tinguely, S.</au><format>book</format><genre>proceeding</genre><ristype>CONF</ristype><atitle>Partitioning attacks: or how to rapidly clone some GSM cards</atitle><btitle>Proceedings - IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy</btitle><stitle>SECPRI</stitle><date>2002</date><risdate>2002</risdate><spage>31</spage><epage>41</epage><pages>31-41</pages><issn>1081-6011</issn><issn>1063-7109</issn><eissn>2375-1207</eissn><isbn>9780769515434</isbn><isbn>0769515436</isbn><abstract>In this paper, we introduce a new class of side-channel attacks called partitioning attacks. We have successfully launched a version of the attack on several implementations of COMP128, the popular GSM authentication algorithm that has been deployed by different service providers in several types of SIM cards, to retrieve the 128 bit key using as few as 8 chosen plaintexts. We show how partitioning attacks can be used effectively to attack implementations that have been equipped with ad hoc and inadequate countermeasures against side-channel attacks. Such ad hoc countermeasures are systemic in implementations of cryptographic algorithms, such as COMP128, which require the use of large tables since there has been a mistaken belief that sound countermeasures require more resources than are available. To address this problem, we describe a new resource-efficient countermeasure for protecting table lookups in cryptographic implementations and justify its correctness rigorously.</abstract><cop>Los Alamitos CA</cop><pub>IEEE</pub><doi>10.1109/SECPRI.2002.1004360</doi><tpages>11</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext_linktorsrc |
| identifier | ISSN: 1081-6011 |
| ispartof | Proceedings - IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, 2002, p.31-41 |
| issn | 1081-6011 1063-7109 2375-1207 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_ieee_primary_1004360 |
| source | IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings |
| subjects | Applied sciences Authentication Cloning Cryptographic protocols Cryptography Exact sciences and technology GSM Information, signal and communications theory Partitioning algorithms Protection Resists Security Signal and communications theory Table lookup Telecommunications Telecommunications and information theory Teleprocessing networks. Isdn |
| title | Partitioning attacks: or how to rapidly clone some GSM cards |
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