Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions
Multiattribute auctions extend traditional auction settings to allow negotiation over nonprice attributes such as weight, color, and terms of delivery, in addition to price and promise to improve market efficiency in markets with configurable goods. This paper provides an iterative auction design fo...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Management science 2005-03, Vol.51 (3), p.435-451 |
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| container_title | Management science |
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| creator | Parkes, David C Kalagnanam, Jayant |
| description | Multiattribute auctions extend traditional auction settings to allow negotiation over nonprice attributes such as weight, color, and terms of delivery, in addition to price and promise to improve market efficiency in markets with configurable goods.
This paper provides an iterative auction design for an important special case of the multiattribute allocation problem with special (preferential independent) additive structure on the buyer value and seller costs. Auction Additive&Discrete provides a refined design for a price-based auction in which the price feedback decomposes to an additive part with a price for each attribute and an aggregate part that appears as a price discount for each supplier. In addition, this design also has excellent information revelation properties that are validated through computational experiments. The auction terminates with an outcome of a modified Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. This paper also develops Auction NonLinear&Discrete for the more general nonlinear casea particularly simple design that solves the general multiattribute allocation problem, but requires that the auctioneer maintains prices on bundles of attribute levels. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0340 |
| format | Article |
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This paper provides an iterative auction design for an important special case of the multiattribute allocation problem with special (preferential independent) additive structure on the buyer value and seller costs. Auction Additive&Discrete provides a refined design for a price-based auction in which the price feedback decomposes to an additive part with a price for each attribute and an aggregate part that appears as a price discount for each supplier. In addition, this design also has excellent information revelation properties that are validated through computational experiments. The auction terminates with an outcome of a modified Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. This paper also develops Auction NonLinear&Discrete for the more general nonlinear casea particularly simple design that solves the general multiattribute allocation problem, but requires that the auctioneer maintains prices on bundles of attribute levels.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0025-1909</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1526-5501</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0340</identifier><identifier>CODEN: MNSCDI</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Linthicum: INFORMS</publisher><subject>Auctions ; Bargaining ; Bidding ; Bids ; Coal ; Contract negotiations ; Cosmic microwave background radiation ; Cost allocation ; Cost functions ; Costs ; Discounts ; Economic theory ; Efficient markets ; Equilibrium ; ex post Nash equilibrium ; Experiments ; Feedback ; Game theory ; Individual behaviour ; iterative auctions ; Linear programming ; Management science ; Microeconomics ; Multiattribute models ; multiattribute negotiation ; Nash equilibrium ; Negotiations ; Outsourcing ; price-based feedback ; Prices ; Pricing ; Procurement ; straightforward bidding ; Studies ; Suppliers ; Valuation ; Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism</subject><ispartof>Management science, 2005-03, Vol.51 (3), p.435-451</ispartof><rights>Copyright 2005 INFORMS</rights><rights>COPYRIGHT 2005 Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences</rights><rights>Copyright Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences Mar 2005</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c639t-7af1a53d6da3c49b61cf89b9b52a659078934e40ca6598bef8f66b984f4c77413</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c639t-7af1a53d6da3c49b61cf89b9b52a659078934e40ca6598bef8f66b984f4c77413</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20110341$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/full/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0340$$EHTML$$P50$$Ginforms$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,799,3679,3994,27901,27902,57992,58225,62589</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://econpapers.repec.org/article/inmormnsc/v_3a51_3ay_3a2005_3ai_3a3_3ap_3a435-451.htm$$DView record in RePEc$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Parkes, David C</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kalagnanam, Jayant</creatorcontrib><title>Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions</title><title>Management science</title><description>Multiattribute auctions extend traditional auction settings to allow negotiation over nonprice attributes such as weight, color, and terms of delivery, in addition to price and promise to improve market efficiency in markets with configurable goods.
This paper provides an iterative auction design for an important special case of the multiattribute allocation problem with special (preferential independent) additive structure on the buyer value and seller costs. Auction Additive&Discrete provides a refined design for a price-based auction in which the price feedback decomposes to an additive part with a price for each attribute and an aggregate part that appears as a price discount for each supplier. In addition, this design also has excellent information revelation properties that are validated through computational experiments. The auction terminates with an outcome of a modified Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. This paper also develops Auction NonLinear&Discrete for the more general nonlinear casea particularly simple design that solves the general multiattribute allocation problem, but requires that the auctioneer maintains prices on bundles of attribute levels.</description><subject>Auctions</subject><subject>Bargaining</subject><subject>Bidding</subject><subject>Bids</subject><subject>Coal</subject><subject>Contract negotiations</subject><subject>Cosmic microwave background radiation</subject><subject>Cost allocation</subject><subject>Cost functions</subject><subject>Costs</subject><subject>Discounts</subject><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Efficient markets</subject><subject>Equilibrium</subject><subject>ex post Nash equilibrium</subject><subject>Experiments</subject><subject>Feedback</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Individual behaviour</subject><subject>iterative auctions</subject><subject>Linear programming</subject><subject>Management science</subject><subject>Microeconomics</subject><subject>Multiattribute models</subject><subject>multiattribute negotiation</subject><subject>Nash equilibrium</subject><subject>Negotiations</subject><subject>Outsourcing</subject><subject>price-based feedback</subject><subject>Prices</subject><subject>Pricing</subject><subject>Procurement</subject><subject>straightforward bidding</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Suppliers</subject><subject>Valuation</subject><subject>Vickrey-Clarke-Groves 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This paper provides an iterative auction design for an important special case of the multiattribute allocation problem with special (preferential independent) additive structure on the buyer value and seller costs. Auction Additive&Discrete provides a refined design for a price-based auction in which the price feedback decomposes to an additive part with a price for each attribute and an aggregate part that appears as a price discount for each supplier. In addition, this design also has excellent information revelation properties that are validated through computational experiments. The auction terminates with an outcome of a modified Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. This paper also develops Auction NonLinear&Discrete for the more general nonlinear casea particularly simple design that solves the general multiattribute allocation problem, but requires that the auctioneer maintains prices on bundles of attribute levels.</abstract><cop>Linthicum</cop><pub>INFORMS</pub><doi>10.1287/mnsc.1040.0340</doi><tpages>17</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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| ispartof | Management science, 2005-03, Vol.51 (3), p.435-451 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; Informs; RePEc; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Auctions Bargaining Bidding Bids Coal Contract negotiations Cosmic microwave background radiation Cost allocation Cost functions Costs Discounts Economic theory Efficient markets Equilibrium ex post Nash equilibrium Experiments Feedback Game theory Individual behaviour iterative auctions Linear programming Management science Microeconomics Multiattribute models multiattribute negotiation Nash equilibrium Negotiations Outsourcing price-based feedback Prices Pricing Procurement straightforward bidding Studies Suppliers Valuation Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism |
| title | Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions |
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