Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies

The purpose of this paper is to study the kind of efficient allocations that can be achieved in exchange economies with asymmetric information, by means of a decentralized mechanism robust to coalitional, strategic deviations. To this end, we define a new strategic equilibrium concept - called stron...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Social choice and welfare 2003-06, Vol.20 (3), p.405-428
Hauptverfasser:	Giraud, Gaël, Rochon, Céline
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Agreements Allocative efficiency Collusion Communication Contract incentives Contracts Economic efficiency Economic theory Economics and Finance Efficient markets Efficient strategies Endowments Equilibrium Exchange Game theory Games Humanities and Social Sciences Indexing in process Mathematical functions Mathematical methods Nash equilibrium Public choice Welfare economics
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