Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies
The purpose of this paper is to study the kind of efficient allocations that can be achieved in exchange economies with asymmetric information, by means of a decentralized mechanism robust to coalitional, strategic deviations. To this end, we define a new strategic equilibrium concept - called stron...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Social choice and welfare 2003-06, Vol.20 (3), p.405-428 |
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| creator | Giraud, Gaël Rochon, Céline |
| description | The purpose of this paper is to study the kind of efficient allocations that can be achieved in exchange economies with asymmetric information, by means of a decentralized mechanism robust to coalitional, strategic deviations. To this end, we define a new strategic equilibrium concept - called strong collusion-proof contract -designed to characterize stable communication agreements in games with differential information against non-binding, self-enforcing and incentive compatible deviations by coalitions. We then construct a strategic market mechanism which, for quasi-linear economies, is such that its strong collusion-proof contracts generically induce the incentive compatible interim efficient allocations. Moreover, we show that these allocations can be achieved by strong collusion-proof contracts. We show that the internally consistent extension of the strong collusion-proof contracts generically yields the same set of efficient allocations. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s003550200189 |
| format | Article |
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We show that the internally consistent extension of the strong collusion-proof contracts generically yields the same set of efficient allocations.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0176-1714</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1432-217X</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1007/s003550200189</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Heidelberg: Springer Science + Business Media</publisher><subject>Agreements ; Allocative efficiency ; Collusion ; Communication ; Contract incentives ; Contracts ; Economic efficiency ; Economic theory ; Economics and Finance ; Efficient markets ; Efficient strategies ; Endowments ; Equilibrium ; Exchange ; Game theory ; Games ; Humanities and Social Sciences ; Indexing in process ; Mathematical functions ; Mathematical methods ; Nash equilibrium ; Public choice ; Welfare economics</subject><ispartof>Social choice and welfare, 2003-06, Vol.20 (3), p.405-428</ispartof><rights>Copyright Springer-Verlag 2003</rights><rights>Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c476t-72b4adc7717fc4a12162e2518ec158b647ef56d745a10a1d2640d6aa86241ca93</citedby><orcidid>0000-0002-8423-0588</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41106531$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/41106531$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>230,314,780,784,803,885,12845,27924,27925,58017,58250</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttps://shs.hal.science/halshs-00499285$$DView record in HAL$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Giraud, Gaël</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Rochon, Céline</creatorcontrib><title>Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies</title><title>Social choice and welfare</title><description>The purpose of this paper is to study the kind of efficient allocations that can be achieved in exchange economies with asymmetric information, by means of a decentralized mechanism robust to coalitional, strategic deviations. 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We show that the internally consistent extension of the strong collusion-proof contracts generically yields the same set of efficient allocations.</description><subject>Agreements</subject><subject>Allocative efficiency</subject><subject>Collusion</subject><subject>Communication</subject><subject>Contract incentives</subject><subject>Contracts</subject><subject>Economic efficiency</subject><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Economics and Finance</subject><subject>Efficient markets</subject><subject>Efficient strategies</subject><subject>Endowments</subject><subject>Equilibrium</subject><subject>Exchange</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Games</subject><subject>Humanities and Social Sciences</subject><subject>Indexing in process</subject><subject>Mathematical functions</subject><subject>Mathematical methods</subject><subject>Nash equilibrium</subject><subject>Public choice</subject><subject>Welfare 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| ispartof | Social choice and welfare, 2003-06, Vol.20 (3), p.405-428 |
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| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; SpringerNature Journals; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; EBSCOhost Political Science Complete |
| subjects | Agreements Allocative efficiency Collusion Communication Contract incentives Contracts Economic efficiency Economic theory Economics and Finance Efficient markets Efficient strategies Endowments Equilibrium Exchange Game theory Games Humanities and Social Sciences Indexing in process Mathematical functions Mathematical methods Nash equilibrium Public choice Welfare economics |
| title | Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies |
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