SELF-SELECTION AND THE EFFICIENCY OF TOURNAMENTS

The literature has shown that the overall efficiency of exogenously imposed tournaments is reduced by a high variance in performance. This article reports results from an experiment analyzing whether allowing subjects to self‐select into different payment schemes is reducing the variability of perfo...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Economic inquiry 2009-07, Vol.47 (3), p.530-548
Hauptverfasser:	ERIKSSON, TOR, TEYSSIER, SABRINA, VILLEVAL, MARIE-CLAIRE
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Brokers Competitions Economics and Finance Efficiency Employee motivation Employees Evaluation Expected utility Experiments Humanities and Social Sciences Labor market Laboratories Methods Price discrimination Risk aversion Studies Tournaments Tournaments & championships
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