AttackDefense Framework (ADF): Enhancing IoT Devices and Lifecycles Threat Modeling
Threat modeling (TM) is essential to manage, prevent, and fix security and privacy issues in our society. TM requires a data model to represent threats and tools to exploit such data. Current TM data models and tools have significant limitations preventing their usage in real-world scenarios. For ex...
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creator | Sacchetti, Tommaso Bognar, Marton De Meulemeester, Jesse Gierlichs, Benedikt Piessens, Frank Bezsmertnyi, Volodymyr Molteni, Maria Chiara Cristalli, Stefano Gringiani, Arianna Thomas, Olivier Antonioli, Daniele |
description | Threat modeling (TM) is essential to manage, prevent, and fix security and privacy issues in our society. TM requires a data model to represent threats and tools to exploit such data. Current TM data models and tools have significant limitations preventing their usage in real-world scenarios. For example, it is challenging to TM embedded devices with current data models and tools as they cannot model their hardware, firmware, and low-level software. Moreover, it is impossible to TM a device lifecycle or security-privacy tradeoffs as these data models and tools were developed for other use cases (e.g., software security or user privacy). We fill this relevant gap by presenting the AttackDefense Framework (ADF), which provides a novel data model and related tools to augment TM. ADF’s building block is the AD object that can be used to represent heterogeneous and complex threats. Moreover, ADF provides automations to process a collection of AD objects, including ways to create sets, maps, chains, trees, and wordclouds of AD objects. We present ADF, a toolkit implementing ADF composed of four modules (Catalog, Parse, Check, and Analyze). We confirm that the data model and tools provided by ADF are useful by running an extensive set of experiments while threat modeling a crypto wallet and its lifecycle. Our experiments involved seven expert groups from academia and industry, each using the ADF on an orthogonal threat class. The evaluation generated 175 high-quality ADs covering ISA/IEC 62433-4-1 SecDev Lifecycle, side-channels, fault injection, microarchitectural attacks, speculative execution, pre-silicon testing, invasive physical chip modifications, Bluetooth protocol and implementation threats, and FIDO2 authentication. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1145/3698396 |
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TM requires a data model to represent threats and tools to exploit such data. Current TM data models and tools have significant limitations preventing their usage in real-world scenarios. For example, it is challenging to TM embedded devices with current data models and tools as they cannot model their hardware, firmware, and low-level software. Moreover, it is impossible to TM a device lifecycle or security-privacy tradeoffs as these data models and tools were developed for other use cases (e.g., software security or user privacy). We fill this relevant gap by presenting the AttackDefense Framework (ADF), which provides a novel data model and related tools to augment TM. ADF’s building block is the AD object that can be used to represent heterogeneous and complex threats. Moreover, ADF provides automations to process a collection of AD objects, including ways to create sets, maps, chains, trees, and wordclouds of AD objects. We present ADF, a toolkit implementing ADF composed of four modules (Catalog, Parse, Check, and Analyze). We confirm that the data model and tools provided by ADF are useful by running an extensive set of experiments while threat modeling a crypto wallet and its lifecycle. Our experiments involved seven expert groups from academia and industry, each using the ADF on an orthogonal threat class. The evaluation generated 175 high-quality ADs covering ISA/IEC 62433-4-1 SecDev Lifecycle, side-channels, fault injection, microarchitectural attacks, speculative execution, pre-silicon testing, invasive physical chip modifications, Bluetooth protocol and implementation threats, and FIDO2 authentication.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1539-9087</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1558-3465</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1145/3698396</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>New York, NY: ACM</publisher><subject>Computer Science ; Cryptography and Security ; Embedded systems security ; Hardware attacks and countermeasures ; Security and privacy ; Tamper-proof and tamper-resistant designs</subject><ispartof>ACM transactions on embedded computing systems, 2024-10</ispartof><rights>Copyright held by the owner/author(s). 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TM requires a data model to represent threats and tools to exploit such data. Current TM data models and tools have significant limitations preventing their usage in real-world scenarios. For example, it is challenging to TM embedded devices with current data models and tools as they cannot model their hardware, firmware, and low-level software. Moreover, it is impossible to TM a device lifecycle or security-privacy tradeoffs as these data models and tools were developed for other use cases (e.g., software security or user privacy). We fill this relevant gap by presenting the AttackDefense Framework (ADF), which provides a novel data model and related tools to augment TM. ADF’s building block is the AD object that can be used to represent heterogeneous and complex threats. Moreover, ADF provides automations to process a collection of AD objects, including ways to create sets, maps, chains, trees, and wordclouds of AD objects. We present ADF, a toolkit implementing ADF composed of four modules (Catalog, Parse, Check, and Analyze). We confirm that the data model and tools provided by ADF are useful by running an extensive set of experiments while threat modeling a crypto wallet and its lifecycle. Our experiments involved seven expert groups from academia and industry, each using the ADF on an orthogonal threat class. The evaluation generated 175 high-quality ADs covering ISA/IEC 62433-4-1 SecDev Lifecycle, side-channels, fault injection, microarchitectural attacks, speculative execution, pre-silicon testing, invasive physical chip modifications, Bluetooth protocol and implementation threats, and FIDO2 authentication.</description><subject>Computer Science</subject><subject>Cryptography and Security</subject><subject>Embedded systems security</subject><subject>Hardware attacks and countermeasures</subject><subject>Security and privacy</subject><subject>Tamper-proof and tamper-resistant designs</subject><issn>1539-9087</issn><issn>1558-3465</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2024</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNo9kM1PwzAMxSMEEmMg7pxygx0KyfLRhFu1DzapiAPjXHmpw8q6FiXT0P57Og128rP985P1CLnl7JFzqZ6EtkZYfUZ6XCmTCKnV-UELm1hm0ktyFeMXYzwdStUj79l2C249Ro9NRDoNsMGfNqzpQzaeDp7ppFlB46rmk87bBR3jrnIYKTQlzSuPbu_qrl2sAsKWvrYl1h16TS481BFv_mqffEwni9Esyd9e5qMsT4BzoxPunZGuFEzIEpCDx3TZ_e7MUjvUrpRol9wpaQGV5lAajmLo1ZApyVIrjOiTwdF3BXXxHaoNhH3RQlXMsrw4zJhMhRJS7njH3h9ZF9oYA_rTAWfFIbfiL7eOvDuS4DYn6H_5C9j4Zas</recordid><startdate>20241008</startdate><enddate>20241008</enddate><creator>Sacchetti, Tommaso</creator><creator>Bognar, Marton</creator><creator>De Meulemeester, Jesse</creator><creator>Gierlichs, Benedikt</creator><creator>Piessens, Frank</creator><creator>Bezsmertnyi, Volodymyr</creator><creator>Molteni, Maria Chiara</creator><creator>Cristalli, Stefano</creator><creator>Gringiani, Arianna</creator><creator>Thomas, Olivier</creator><creator>Antonioli, Daniele</creator><general>ACM</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>1XC</scope><scope>VOOES</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0009-0001-9722-9949</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0009-0001-6914-7428</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2901-2972</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0009-0009-6146-6465</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0009-0000-0508-1709</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5438-153X</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8641-7549</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0124-4467</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2295-9979</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5866-1990</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9342-3920</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20241008</creationdate><title>AttackDefense Framework (ADF): Enhancing IoT Devices and Lifecycles Threat Modeling</title><author>Sacchetti, Tommaso ; Bognar, Marton ; De Meulemeester, Jesse ; Gierlichs, Benedikt ; Piessens, Frank ; Bezsmertnyi, Volodymyr ; Molteni, Maria Chiara ; Cristalli, Stefano ; Gringiani, Arianna ; Thomas, Olivier ; Antonioli, Daniele</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-a1186-1fc84cd3034dae1afe7b698c8b6ce6cd4e9b1c549ae561ad81e32f52054079383</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2024</creationdate><topic>Computer Science</topic><topic>Cryptography and Security</topic><topic>Embedded systems security</topic><topic>Hardware attacks and countermeasures</topic><topic>Security and privacy</topic><topic>Tamper-proof and tamper-resistant designs</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Sacchetti, Tommaso</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Bognar, Marton</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>De Meulemeester, Jesse</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Gierlichs, Benedikt</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Piessens, Frank</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Bezsmertnyi, Volodymyr</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Molteni, Maria Chiara</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Cristalli, Stefano</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Gringiani, Arianna</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Thomas, Olivier</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Antonioli, Daniele</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Hyper Article en Ligne (HAL)</collection><collection>Hyper Article en Ligne (HAL) (Open Access)</collection><jtitle>ACM transactions on embedded computing systems</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Sacchetti, Tommaso</au><au>Bognar, Marton</au><au>De Meulemeester, Jesse</au><au>Gierlichs, Benedikt</au><au>Piessens, Frank</au><au>Bezsmertnyi, Volodymyr</au><au>Molteni, Maria Chiara</au><au>Cristalli, Stefano</au><au>Gringiani, Arianna</au><au>Thomas, Olivier</au><au>Antonioli, Daniele</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>AttackDefense Framework (ADF): Enhancing IoT Devices and Lifecycles Threat Modeling</atitle><jtitle>ACM transactions on embedded computing systems</jtitle><stitle>ACM TECS</stitle><date>2024-10-08</date><risdate>2024</risdate><issn>1539-9087</issn><eissn>1558-3465</eissn><abstract>Threat modeling (TM) is essential to manage, prevent, and fix security and privacy issues in our society. TM requires a data model to represent threats and tools to exploit such data. Current TM data models and tools have significant limitations preventing their usage in real-world scenarios. For example, it is challenging to TM embedded devices with current data models and tools as they cannot model their hardware, firmware, and low-level software. Moreover, it is impossible to TM a device lifecycle or security-privacy tradeoffs as these data models and tools were developed for other use cases (e.g., software security or user privacy). We fill this relevant gap by presenting the AttackDefense Framework (ADF), which provides a novel data model and related tools to augment TM. ADF’s building block is the AD object that can be used to represent heterogeneous and complex threats. Moreover, ADF provides automations to process a collection of AD objects, including ways to create sets, maps, chains, trees, and wordclouds of AD objects. 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subjects | Computer Science Cryptography and Security Embedded systems security Hardware attacks and countermeasures Security and privacy Tamper-proof and tamper-resistant designs |
title | AttackDefense Framework (ADF): Enhancing IoT Devices and Lifecycles Threat Modeling |
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