Intermediation and discrimination in an investment game: An experimental study

•We present a three-players’ variant of the trust game with different group identity.•Intermediaries are more prone to discrimination than standard senders.•Discrimination from intermediaries is mainly due to preferences for in-group members.•Standard senders display more statistical considerations...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of economic behavior & organization 2019-12, Vol.168, p.196-208
Hauptverfasser:	Cochard, François, Flage, Alexandre, Peterle, Emmanuel
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Discrimination Intermediation Quantitative Finance Responsibility Social identity Trust game
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!