Entry in first-price auctions with signaling
We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the participation decisions and the auction outcome are used by an outside observer to infer the bidders’ types. We show that this auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding functi...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | International journal of game theory 2023-06, Vol.52 (2), p.423-450 |
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| container_end_page | 450 |
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| container_title | International journal of game theory |
| container_volume | 52 |
| creator | Bos, Olivier Truyts, Tom |
| description | We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the participation decisions and the auction outcome are used by an outside observer to infer the bidders’ types. We show that this auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding function. When the bidders’ sensibility for the signaling concern is sufficiently strong, the expected revenue maximizing entry fee is the maximal fee that guarantees full participation. The larger is the bidder’s sensibility, the higher is the optimal participation. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s00182-022-00823-2 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | International journal of game theory, 2023-06, Vol.52 (2), p.423-450 |
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| source | Business Source Complete; SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings |
| subjects | Auctions Behavioral/Experimental Economics Bidding Bids Charities Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Equilibrium Expected values Fees & charges Game Theory Government purchasing Humanities and Social Sciences Operations Research/Decision Theory Optimization Original Paper Participation Signaling Social and Behav. Sciences |
| title | Entry in first-price auctions with signaling |
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