Insider Imitation
Many platforms operating online marketplaces sell their own products alongside those of third-party sellers, and may use marketplace data on the demand for third-party products to inform the launch of their own products. To evaluate the anti-competitive implications of this practice, we model how a...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | SSRN Electronic Journal 2024 |
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| creator | Madsen, Erik |
| description | Many platforms operating online marketplaces sell their own products alongside those of third-party sellers, and may use marketplace data on the demand for third-party products to inform the launch of their own products. To evaluate the anti-competitive implications of this practice, we model how a platform who can commit to a product introduction policy optimally uses marketplace data. An optimal policy trades off the ex post profitability of imitating successful third-party products against the ex ante reduction in innovation caused by imitation. We find that a regulation which bans the sharing of marketplace data stimulates innovation for "experimental" products with significant upside demand potential, but stifles it for "incremental" products with little upside potential |
| doi_str_mv | 10.2139/ssrn.3832712 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 1556-5068 |
| ispartof | SSRN Electronic Journal, 2024 |
| issn | 1556-5068 0022-3808 1556-5068 1537-534X |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_hal_primary_oai_HAL_hal_04465669v1 |
| source | University of Chicago Press Journals (Full run); Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Economics and Finance Humanities and Social Sciences |
| title | Insider Imitation |
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