Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts
This paper develops a novel approach to estimate how contract and principal-agent characteristics influence a post-auction outcome when the matching between agents and principals derives from an auction process. We propose a control-function approach to account jointly for the endogeneity of contrac...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of econometrics 2023-08, Vol.235 (2), p.1172-1202 |
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creator | Lamy, Laurent Patnam, Manasa Visser, Michael |
description | This paper develops a novel approach to estimate how contract and principal-agent characteristics influence a post-auction outcome when the matching between agents and principals derives from an auction process. We propose a control-function approach to account jointly for the endogeneity of contracts and matching. This consists of, first, estimating the primitives of an interdependent values auction model-which is shown to be non-parametrically identified from the bidding data-second, constructing control functions based on the distribution of the unobserved private signals conditional on the auction outcome. A Monte Carlo study shows that our augmented outcome equation corrects the endogeneity biases well, even in small samples. We apply our methodology to a labor market application and estimate the effect of sports players' auction-determined wages on their individual performances. We also use our structural estimates to evaluate the strength of matching inefficiencies and assess counterfactual reservation wage policies. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jeconom.2022.10.003 |
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title | Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts |
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