Network games with incomplete information
We consider a network game with strategic complementarities where the individual reward or the strength of interactions is only partially known by the agents. Players receive different correlated signals and they make inferences about other players’ information. We demonstrate that there exists a un...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of mathematical economics 2015-12, Vol.61, p.221-240 |
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| container_title | Journal of mathematical economics |
| container_volume | 61 |
| creator | de Martí, Joan Zenou, Yves |
| description | We consider a network game with strategic complementarities where the individual reward or the strength of interactions is only partially known by the agents. Players receive different correlated signals and they make inferences about other players’ information. We demonstrate that there exists a unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. We characterize the equilibrium by disentangling the information effects from the network effects and show that the equilibrium effort of each agent is a weighted combinations of different Katz–Bonacich centralities. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.002 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0304-4068 |
| ispartof | Journal of mathematical economics, 2015-12, Vol.61, p.221-240 |
| issn | 0304-4068 1873-1538 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_hal_primary_oai_HAL_hal_04329656v1 |
| source | Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals |
| subjects | Agency theory Bayesian analysis Bayesian games Bayesian method Correlation analysis Economics and Finance Equilibrium Game theory Humanities and Social Sciences Social networks Strategic complementarities Studies |
| title | Network games with incomplete information |
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