Does environment pay for politicians?

We econometrically assess how elections affect environmental performance, namely climate policy, using a sample of 76 democratic countries from 1990 to 2014. Three key results emerge from our system-GMM estimations. First, CO2 emissions increase in election years, suggesting that incumbents engage i...

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Veröffentlicht in:Economic modelling 2023-11, Vol.128, p.106491, Article 106491
Hauptverfasser: Boly, Mohamed, Combes, Jean-Louis, Combes Motel, Pascale
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Combes, Jean-Louis
Combes Motel, Pascale
description We econometrically assess how elections affect environmental performance, namely climate policy, using a sample of 76 democratic countries from 1990 to 2014. Three key results emerge from our system-GMM estimations. First, CO2 emissions increase in election years, suggesting that incumbents engage in fiscal manipulation through the composition of public spending rather than its level. Second, the effect has weakened over recent years and is present only in established democracies. Third, higher freedom of the press and high income that can proxy high environmental preferences from citizens reduce the size of this trade-off between pork-barrel spending and the public good, namely environmental quality. Deteriorating environmental quality can bring electoral benefits to politicians. •Politicians balance pork barrel expenditures against the provision of public goods.•CO2 emissions rose during election years in democratic countries from 1990 to 2014.•Press freedom and greener preferences fade environmental political cycles.•Elections can have a visible influence on countries’ environmental performance.•Harming the quality of the environment brings an electoral benefit.
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subjects CO2 emissions
Electoral cycles
Environmental policy
Panel data
Quantitative Finance
title Does environment pay for politicians?
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