The independence of central banks: a reductio ad absurdum

This paper testifies to the fact that the proclaimed independence of central banks, as conceived by its founders, is nothing more than a chimera. We demonstrate that the hypothesis ‘inflation is a purely monetary phenomenon’ does not substantiate the case for independence. Further, the portrayal of...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:The journal of philosophical economics 2024-03, Vol.XVII (Articles)
Hauptverfasser: Pohoață, Ion, Diaconașu, Delia-Elena, Negru, Ioana
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page
container_issue Articles
container_start_page
container_title The journal of philosophical economics
container_volume XVII
creator Pohoață, Ion
Diaconașu, Delia-Elena
Negru, Ioana
description This paper testifies to the fact that the proclaimed independence of central banks, as conceived by its founders, is nothing more than a chimera. We demonstrate that the hypothesis ‘inflation is a purely monetary phenomenon’ does not substantiate the case for independence. Further, the portrayal of the conservative central banker, the imaginary principal-agent contract, the alleged financial autonomy, along with the ban on budgetary financing, amount to flawed logic in arguing for the independence of the central bank. We also highlight that the idea of independence is not convincing due to the absence of well-defined outlines in its operational toolbox and the system of rules it relies upon.
doi_str_mv 10.46298/jpe.12256
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>hal_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_hal_primary_oai_HAL_hal_04183244v2</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>oai_HAL_hal_04183244v2</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c1056-6d6cda2954b8b4a048e5bc0d9269d479385820dabc120d41cdc1a89a5aaafab83</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpNkE9LAzEQxYMoWGovfoJcFbYm2UmaeCtFrbDgpZ7D5M_SrdvdknQFv71rK-Jl3jC89xh-hNxyNgcljH7YHeKcCyHVBZlwDVBowfTlv_2azHLeMcY4Wwgu1YSYzTbSpgvxEMfR-Uj7mvrYHRO21GH3kR8p0hTD4I9NTzFQdHlIYdjfkKsa2xxnvzol789Pm9W6qN5eXlfLqvCcSVWooHxAYSQ47QAZ6CidZ8EIZQIsTKnl-FlA5_kowH3wHLVBiYg1Ol1Oyd25d4utPaRmj-nL9tjY9bKyPzcGXJcC4FOM3vuz16c-5xTrvwBn9sTIjozsiVH5DSIeWDc</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Open Access Repository</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype></control><display><type>article</type><title>The independence of central banks: a reductio ad absurdum</title><source>EZB Electronic Journals Library</source><creator>Pohoață, Ion ; Diaconașu, Delia-Elena ; Negru, Ioana</creator><creatorcontrib>Pohoață, Ion ; Diaconașu, Delia-Elena ; Negru, Ioana</creatorcontrib><description>This paper testifies to the fact that the proclaimed independence of central banks, as conceived by its founders, is nothing more than a chimera. We demonstrate that the hypothesis ‘inflation is a purely monetary phenomenon’ does not substantiate the case for independence. Further, the portrayal of the conservative central banker, the imaginary principal-agent contract, the alleged financial autonomy, along with the ban on budgetary financing, amount to flawed logic in arguing for the independence of the central bank. We also highlight that the idea of independence is not convincing due to the absence of well-defined outlines in its operational toolbox and the system of rules it relies upon.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1844-8208</identifier><identifier>ISSN: 1843-2298</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1844-8208</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.46298/jpe.12256</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Rosetti Educational</publisher><subject>Economics and Finance ; Humanities and Social Sciences</subject><ispartof>The journal of philosophical economics, 2024-03, Vol.XVII (Articles)</ispartof><rights>Attribution - NonCommercial - ShareAlike</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><orcidid>0000-0002-1046-3864 ; 0000-0001-6879-1855 ; 0000-0002-9955-3873</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>230,314,780,784,885,27924,27925</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttps://hal.science/hal-04183244$$DView record in HAL$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Pohoață, Ion</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Diaconașu, Delia-Elena</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Negru, Ioana</creatorcontrib><title>The independence of central banks: a reductio ad absurdum</title><title>The journal of philosophical economics</title><description>This paper testifies to the fact that the proclaimed independence of central banks, as conceived by its founders, is nothing more than a chimera. We demonstrate that the hypothesis ‘inflation is a purely monetary phenomenon’ does not substantiate the case for independence. Further, the portrayal of the conservative central banker, the imaginary principal-agent contract, the alleged financial autonomy, along with the ban on budgetary financing, amount to flawed logic in arguing for the independence of the central bank. We also highlight that the idea of independence is not convincing due to the absence of well-defined outlines in its operational toolbox and the system of rules it relies upon.</description><subject>Economics and Finance</subject><subject>Humanities and Social Sciences</subject><issn>1844-8208</issn><issn>1843-2298</issn><issn>1844-8208</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2024</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNpNkE9LAzEQxYMoWGovfoJcFbYm2UmaeCtFrbDgpZ7D5M_SrdvdknQFv71rK-Jl3jC89xh-hNxyNgcljH7YHeKcCyHVBZlwDVBowfTlv_2azHLeMcY4Wwgu1YSYzTbSpgvxEMfR-Uj7mvrYHRO21GH3kR8p0hTD4I9NTzFQdHlIYdjfkKsa2xxnvzol789Pm9W6qN5eXlfLqvCcSVWooHxAYSQ47QAZ6CidZ8EIZQIsTKnl-FlA5_kowH3wHLVBiYg1Ol1Oyd25d4utPaRmj-nL9tjY9bKyPzcGXJcC4FOM3vuz16c-5xTrvwBn9sTIjozsiVH5DSIeWDc</recordid><startdate>20240311</startdate><enddate>20240311</enddate><creator>Pohoață, Ion</creator><creator>Diaconașu, Delia-Elena</creator><creator>Negru, Ioana</creator><general>Rosetti Educational</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>1XC</scope><scope>BXJBU</scope><scope>IHQJB</scope><scope>VOOES</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1046-3864</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6879-1855</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9955-3873</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20240311</creationdate><title>The independence of central banks: a reductio ad absurdum</title><author>Pohoață, Ion ; Diaconașu, Delia-Elena ; Negru, Ioana</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c1056-6d6cda2954b8b4a048e5bc0d9269d479385820dabc120d41cdc1a89a5aaafab83</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2024</creationdate><topic>Economics and Finance</topic><topic>Humanities and Social Sciences</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Pohoață, Ion</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Diaconașu, Delia-Elena</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Negru, Ioana</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Hyper Article en Ligne (HAL)</collection><collection>HAL-SHS: Archive ouverte en Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société</collection><collection>HAL-SHS: Archive ouverte en Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société (Open Access)</collection><collection>Hyper Article en Ligne (HAL) (Open Access)</collection><jtitle>The journal of philosophical economics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Pohoață, Ion</au><au>Diaconașu, Delia-Elena</au><au>Negru, Ioana</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>The independence of central banks: a reductio ad absurdum</atitle><jtitle>The journal of philosophical economics</jtitle><date>2024-03-11</date><risdate>2024</risdate><volume>XVII</volume><issue>Articles</issue><issn>1844-8208</issn><issn>1843-2298</issn><eissn>1844-8208</eissn><abstract>This paper testifies to the fact that the proclaimed independence of central banks, as conceived by its founders, is nothing more than a chimera. We demonstrate that the hypothesis ‘inflation is a purely monetary phenomenon’ does not substantiate the case for independence. Further, the portrayal of the conservative central banker, the imaginary principal-agent contract, the alleged financial autonomy, along with the ban on budgetary financing, amount to flawed logic in arguing for the independence of the central bank. We also highlight that the idea of independence is not convincing due to the absence of well-defined outlines in its operational toolbox and the system of rules it relies upon.</abstract><pub>Rosetti Educational</pub><doi>10.46298/jpe.12256</doi><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1046-3864</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6879-1855</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9955-3873</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 1844-8208
ispartof The journal of philosophical economics, 2024-03, Vol.XVII (Articles)
issn 1844-8208
1843-2298
1844-8208
language eng
recordid cdi_hal_primary_oai_HAL_hal_04183244v2
source EZB Electronic Journals Library
subjects Economics and Finance
Humanities and Social Sciences
title The independence of central banks: a reductio ad absurdum
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-25T05%3A23%3A37IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-hal_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=The%20independence%20of%20central%20banks:%20a%20reductio%20ad%20absurdum&rft.jtitle=The%20journal%20of%20philosophical%20economics&rft.au=Pohoa%C8%9B%C4%83,%20Ion&rft.date=2024-03-11&rft.volume=XVII&rft.issue=Articles&rft.issn=1844-8208&rft.eissn=1844-8208&rft_id=info:doi/10.46298/jpe.12256&rft_dat=%3Chal_cross%3Eoai_HAL_hal_04183244v2%3C/hal_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true