Preventing Bottlenecks in Organizations
Organizations may suffer from unforeseen negative shocks, potentially leading to severe bottlenecks. This paper studies an optimal incentive scheme robust to those shocks in the effort induction problem in team production. The optimal scheme under the no-shock assumption is typically vulnerable in t...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | AEA papers and proceedings 2022-05, Vol.112, p.444-451 |
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| container_title | AEA papers and proceedings |
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| creator | Moriya, Fumitoshi Yamashita, Takuro |
| description | Organizations may suffer from unforeseen negative shocks, potentially leading to severe bottlenecks. This paper studies an optimal incentive scheme robust to those shocks in the effort induction problem in team production. The optimal scheme under the no-shock assumption is typically vulnerable in that a single shock can lead to shirking of sizable non-shocked members. We show that an optimal scheme is associated with a uniform order of worker subsets; and identify relative complementarity as a novel source of the determinant of the optimal organization structure. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1257/pandp.20221089 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | AEA papers and proceedings, 2022-05, Vol.112, p.444-451 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; American Economic Association Web |
| subjects | Arbeitsethik Arbeitsgruppe Economics and Finance Engpass Humanities and Social Sciences Leistungsentgelt OPTIMAL UNIQUE-IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS Organisation Schock Theorie |
| title | Preventing Bottlenecks in Organizations |
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