Analytic Engagement and the Perils of Reframing the Dual- and Single-Process Models Debate
In a previous article published in Perspectives, I questioned whether the debate between dual- and single-process models of thinking is empirically tractable and argued that psychological scientists should leave it behind. Dewey (this issue) suggests that by reframing the debate in cognitive-modelin...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Perspectives on psychological science 2021-11, Vol.16 (6), p.1432-1434 |
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description | In a previous article published in Perspectives, I questioned whether the debate between dual- and single-process models of thinking is empirically tractable and argued that psychological scientists should leave it behind. Dewey (this issue) suggests that by reframing the debate in cognitive-modeling terms, it might become tractable and consequential. More specifically, she proposes that focusing on the question of whether analytic engagement (i.e., the process by which additional resources are allocated to a reasoning problem) is discrete or continuous might allow us to settle the debate. Here I illustrate how this suggestion is likely to face the same tractability problems as the original defining-features approach that it is supposed to replace. |
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subjects | Cognitive science Employment Frame analysis Humans Male Problem Solving Resource allocation Thinking |
title | Analytic Engagement and the Perils of Reframing the Dual- and Single-Process Models Debate |
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