Analytic Engagement and the Perils of Reframing the Dual- and Single-Process Models Debate

In a previous article published in Perspectives, I questioned whether the debate between dual- and single-process models of thinking is empirically tractable and argued that psychological scientists should leave it behind. Dewey (this issue) suggests that by reframing the debate in cognitive-modelin...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Perspectives on psychological science 2021-11, Vol.16 (6), p.1432-1434
1. Verfasser: De Neys, Wim
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page 1434
container_issue 6
container_start_page 1432
container_title Perspectives on psychological science
container_volume 16
creator De Neys, Wim
description In a previous article published in Perspectives, I questioned whether the debate between dual- and single-process models of thinking is empirically tractable and argued that psychological scientists should leave it behind. Dewey (this issue) suggests that by reframing the debate in cognitive-modeling terms, it might become tractable and consequential. More specifically, she proposes that focusing on the question of whether analytic engagement (i.e., the process by which additional resources are allocated to a reasoning problem) is discrete or continuous might allow us to settle the debate. Here I illustrate how this suggestion is likely to face the same tractability problems as the original defining-features approach that it is supposed to replace.
doi_str_mv 10.1177/17456916211039848
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_hal_p</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_hal_primary_oai_HAL_hal_03478258v1</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sage_id>10.1177_17456916211039848</sage_id><sourcerecordid>2592201692</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c397t-11219e3d45d323cd09ae519346ad852523955b12e6587fa8aa871fbd7209c65e3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp1kUtLw0AUhQdRfFR_gBsJuNFFdO48M8vS-oKK4mPjJkyTmxrJQ2cSwX_vtNUKiqs7HL5z7nAPIftATwC0PgUtpDKgGADlJhHJGtmea7EyTKyv3qC2yI73L5RKGsBNssWF4MoIuU2eho2tProyi86amZ1hjU0X2SaPumeMbtGVlY_aIrrDwtm6bGYLfdzbKl5Q90GqML51bYbeR9dtjsEwxqntcJdsFLbyuPc1B-Tx_OxhdBlPbi6uRsNJnHGjuxiAgUGeC5lzxrOcGosSDBfK5olkknEj5RQYKpnowibWJhqKaa4ZNZmSyAfkeJn7bKv01ZW1dR9pa8v0cjhJ5xrlQidMJu8Q2KMl--ratx59l9alz7CqbINt71MmlaIcmBYBPfyFvrS9C9eaU4YxCuHKgYIllbnWe4fF6gdA03lJ6Z-SgufgK7mf1pivHN-tBOBkCfjQyM_a_xM_AeNhlZ4</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Open Access Repository</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2592201692</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Analytic Engagement and the Perils of Reframing the Dual- and Single-Process Models Debate</title><source>Applied Social Sciences Index &amp; Abstracts (ASSIA)</source><source>SAGE Complete A-Z List</source><source>MEDLINE</source><creator>De Neys, Wim</creator><creatorcontrib>De Neys, Wim</creatorcontrib><description>In a previous article published in Perspectives, I questioned whether the debate between dual- and single-process models of thinking is empirically tractable and argued that psychological scientists should leave it behind. Dewey (this issue) suggests that by reframing the debate in cognitive-modeling terms, it might become tractable and consequential. More specifically, she proposes that focusing on the question of whether analytic engagement (i.e., the process by which additional resources are allocated to a reasoning problem) is discrete or continuous might allow us to settle the debate. Here I illustrate how this suggestion is likely to face the same tractability problems as the original defining-features approach that it is supposed to replace.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1745-6916</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1745-6924</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1177/17456916211039848</identifier><identifier>PMID: 34436945</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications</publisher><subject>Cognitive science ; Employment ; Frame analysis ; Humans ; Male ; Problem Solving ; Resource allocation ; Thinking</subject><ispartof>Perspectives on psychological science, 2021-11, Vol.16 (6), p.1432-1434</ispartof><rights>The Author(s) 2021</rights><rights>Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c397t-11219e3d45d323cd09ae519346ad852523955b12e6587fa8aa871fbd7209c65e3</cites><orcidid>0000-0003-0917-8852</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/17456916211039848$$EPDF$$P50$$Gsage$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/17456916211039848$$EHTML$$P50$$Gsage$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>230,314,776,780,881,21798,27901,27902,30976,43597,43598</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34436945$$D View this record in MEDLINE/PubMed$$Hfree_for_read</backlink><backlink>$$Uhttps://hal.science/hal-03478258$$DView record in HAL$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>De Neys, Wim</creatorcontrib><title>Analytic Engagement and the Perils of Reframing the Dual- and Single-Process Models Debate</title><title>Perspectives on psychological science</title><addtitle>Perspect Psychol Sci</addtitle><description>In a previous article published in Perspectives, I questioned whether the debate between dual- and single-process models of thinking is empirically tractable and argued that psychological scientists should leave it behind. Dewey (this issue) suggests that by reframing the debate in cognitive-modeling terms, it might become tractable and consequential. More specifically, she proposes that focusing on the question of whether analytic engagement (i.e., the process by which additional resources are allocated to a reasoning problem) is discrete or continuous might allow us to settle the debate. Here I illustrate how this suggestion is likely to face the same tractability problems as the original defining-features approach that it is supposed to replace.</description><subject>Cognitive science</subject><subject>Employment</subject><subject>Frame analysis</subject><subject>Humans</subject><subject>Male</subject><subject>Problem Solving</subject><subject>Resource allocation</subject><subject>Thinking</subject><issn>1745-6916</issn><issn>1745-6924</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2021</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>EIF</sourceid><sourceid>7QJ</sourceid><recordid>eNp1kUtLw0AUhQdRfFR_gBsJuNFFdO48M8vS-oKK4mPjJkyTmxrJQ2cSwX_vtNUKiqs7HL5z7nAPIftATwC0PgUtpDKgGADlJhHJGtmea7EyTKyv3qC2yI73L5RKGsBNssWF4MoIuU2eho2tProyi86amZ1hjU0X2SaPumeMbtGVlY_aIrrDwtm6bGYLfdzbKl5Q90GqML51bYbeR9dtjsEwxqntcJdsFLbyuPc1B-Tx_OxhdBlPbi6uRsNJnHGjuxiAgUGeC5lzxrOcGosSDBfK5olkknEj5RQYKpnowibWJhqKaa4ZNZmSyAfkeJn7bKv01ZW1dR9pa8v0cjhJ5xrlQidMJu8Q2KMl--ratx59l9alz7CqbINt71MmlaIcmBYBPfyFvrS9C9eaU4YxCuHKgYIllbnWe4fF6gdA03lJ6Z-SgufgK7mf1pivHN-tBOBkCfjQyM_a_xM_AeNhlZ4</recordid><startdate>202111</startdate><enddate>202111</enddate><creator>De Neys, Wim</creator><general>SAGE Publications</general><general>SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC</general><general>Association for Psychological Science</general><scope>CGR</scope><scope>CUY</scope><scope>CVF</scope><scope>ECM</scope><scope>EIF</scope><scope>NPM</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7QJ</scope><scope>7X8</scope><scope>1XC</scope><scope>VOOES</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0917-8852</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>202111</creationdate><title>Analytic Engagement and the Perils of Reframing the Dual- and Single-Process Models Debate</title><author>De Neys, Wim</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c397t-11219e3d45d323cd09ae519346ad852523955b12e6587fa8aa871fbd7209c65e3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2021</creationdate><topic>Cognitive science</topic><topic>Employment</topic><topic>Frame analysis</topic><topic>Humans</topic><topic>Male</topic><topic>Problem Solving</topic><topic>Resource allocation</topic><topic>Thinking</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>De Neys, Wim</creatorcontrib><collection>Medline</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE (Ovid)</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>PubMed</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Applied Social Sciences Index &amp; Abstracts (ASSIA)</collection><collection>MEDLINE - Academic</collection><collection>Hyper Article en Ligne (HAL)</collection><collection>Hyper Article en Ligne (HAL) (Open Access)</collection><jtitle>Perspectives on psychological science</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>De Neys, Wim</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Analytic Engagement and the Perils of Reframing the Dual- and Single-Process Models Debate</atitle><jtitle>Perspectives on psychological science</jtitle><addtitle>Perspect Psychol Sci</addtitle><date>2021-11</date><risdate>2021</risdate><volume>16</volume><issue>6</issue><spage>1432</spage><epage>1434</epage><pages>1432-1434</pages><issn>1745-6916</issn><eissn>1745-6924</eissn><abstract>In a previous article published in Perspectives, I questioned whether the debate between dual- and single-process models of thinking is empirically tractable and argued that psychological scientists should leave it behind. Dewey (this issue) suggests that by reframing the debate in cognitive-modeling terms, it might become tractable and consequential. More specifically, she proposes that focusing on the question of whether analytic engagement (i.e., the process by which additional resources are allocated to a reasoning problem) is discrete or continuous might allow us to settle the debate. Here I illustrate how this suggestion is likely to face the same tractability problems as the original defining-features approach that it is supposed to replace.</abstract><cop>Los Angeles, CA</cop><pub>SAGE Publications</pub><pmid>34436945</pmid><doi>10.1177/17456916211039848</doi><tpages>3</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0917-8852</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 1745-6916
ispartof Perspectives on psychological science, 2021-11, Vol.16 (6), p.1432-1434
issn 1745-6916
1745-6924
language eng
recordid cdi_hal_primary_oai_HAL_hal_03478258v1
source Applied Social Sciences Index & Abstracts (ASSIA); SAGE Complete A-Z List; MEDLINE
subjects Cognitive science
Employment
Frame analysis
Humans
Male
Problem Solving
Resource allocation
Thinking
title Analytic Engagement and the Perils of Reframing the Dual- and Single-Process Models Debate
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-02-02T16%3A54%3A03IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_hal_p&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Analytic%20Engagement%20and%20the%20Perils%20of%20Reframing%20the%20Dual-%20and%20Single-Process%20Models%20Debate&rft.jtitle=Perspectives%20on%20psychological%20science&rft.au=De%20Neys,%20Wim&rft.date=2021-11&rft.volume=16&rft.issue=6&rft.spage=1432&rft.epage=1434&rft.pages=1432-1434&rft.issn=1745-6916&rft.eissn=1745-6924&rft_id=info:doi/10.1177/17456916211039848&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_hal_p%3E2592201692%3C/proquest_hal_p%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2592201692&rft_id=info:pmid/34436945&rft_sage_id=10.1177_17456916211039848&rfr_iscdi=true