Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited
We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in single-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness outlook these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irresolute rules without violating anonymity, neutralit...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Social choice and welfare 2021-07, Vol.57 (1), p.97-113 |
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| container_title | Social choice and welfare |
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| creator | Ozkes, Ali I. Sanver, M. Remzi |
| description | We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in single-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness outlook these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irresolute rules without violating anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency. Next, we propose a weakening of neutrality called
consequential neutrality
that requires resolute social choice rules to assign each alternative to the same number of profiles. We explore social choice problems in which consequential neutrality resolves impossibilities that stem from the fundamental tension between anonymity, neutrality, and resoluteness. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s00355-020-01308-5 |
| format | Article |
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consequential neutrality
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consequential neutrality
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consequential neutrality
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| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; SpringerNature Journals; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; EBSCOhost Political Science Complete |
| subjects | Anonymity Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Game Theory Humanities and Social Sciences International Political Economy Neutrality Original Paper Public Finance Social and Behav. Sciences Social choice Social Policy Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion |
| title | Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited |
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