The strong referendum paradox

We study a model of indirect elections where voters having weak orders as preferences over finitely many alternatives are distributed across a given set of districts. In each district preferences are aggregated into a district preference, and a voting rule selects one or several alternatives from th...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Quality & quantity 2017-07, Vol.51 (4), p.1707-1731
Hauptverfasser:	Dindar, Hayrullah, Laffond, Gilbert, Laine, Jean
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Analysis Districts Economics and Finance Elections Humanities and Social Sciences Methodology of the Social Sciences Operations research Political aspects Referendum Referendums Representative democracy Scores Social Sciences Voters Voting Voting rules
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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