Insurance law and incomplete contracts

We analyze how insurance law can mitigate moral hazard by allowing insurers to reduce or cancel coverage in some circumstances. We consider an incomplete contract setting in which the insurer may obtain information related to the policyholder's behavior through a costly audit of the circumstanc...

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Veröffentlicht in:	IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc 2020-12, Vol.51 (4), p.1253-1286
Hauptverfasser:	Bourgeon, Jean-Marc, Picard, Pierre
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Analysis Audits Burden of proof Court decisions Courts Economics and Finance Humanities and Social Sciences Insurance Insurance law Moral hazard Sanctions Standard of proof State court decisions
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