Belief-consistent Pareto dominance
The classic Pareto criterion claims that all voluntary trades, even on the grounds of heterogeneous beliefs, should be encouraged. I argue that a trade without hope for Pareto improvement remains controversial. I introduce and characterize a notion of belief-consistent Pareto dominance to formalize...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Economic theory bulletin 2020-10, Vol.8 (2), p.219-229 |
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| container_title | Economic theory bulletin |
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| creator | Qu, Xiangyu |
| description | The classic Pareto criterion claims that all voluntary trades, even on the grounds of heterogeneous beliefs, should be encouraged. I argue that a trade without hope for Pareto improvement remains controversial. I introduce and characterize a notion of
belief-consistent
Pareto dominance to formalize this argument, which, in addition to unanimity of preferences, requires all rankings in a trade to be supported by some common beliefs that must coincide with the agents’ beliefs about the events on which all agents agree. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s40505-019-00178-0 |
| format | Article |
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belief-consistent
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belief-consistent
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belief-consistent
Pareto dominance to formalize this argument, which, in addition to unanimity of preferences, requires all rankings in a trade to be supported by some common beliefs that must coincide with the agents’ beliefs about the events on which all agents agree.</abstract><cop>Cham</cop><pub>Springer International Publishing</pub><doi>10.1007/s40505-019-00178-0</doi><tpages>11</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8823-815X</orcidid></addata></record> |
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| ispartof | Economic theory bulletin, 2020-10, Vol.8 (2), p.219-229 |
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| source | ProQuest Central Essentials; ProQuest Central Student; SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings |
| subjects | Belief & doubt Beliefs Dominance Economic theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Game Theory Heterogeneity Humanities and Social Sciences Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics Pareto optimum Public Finance Research Article Social and Behav. Sciences |
| title | Belief-consistent Pareto dominance |
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